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Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step
Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties
David L. Sloss*
The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Medellin v. Texas unleashed a flood of new scholarship on the
doctrine of self-executing treaties. Unfortunately, the entire debate has been founded on two erroneous
assumptions. First, courts and commentators have assumed that self-execution is a treaty interpretation
question. Second, they have assumed that the modern doctrine of self-execution is essentially the same as the
doctrine articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in his seminal opinion in Foster v. Neilson. The consensus view is wrong on both counts.
Properly framed, the self-execution inquiry comprises two distinct questions. First, what does the treaty
obligate the United States to do? This is a question of international law governed by treaty interpretation
principles. Second, which government actors within the United States are responsible for domestic treaty
implementation? This is a question of domestic law, not international law: treaties almost never answer
this question. Even so, courts and commentators routinely analyze domestic implementation issues by examining treaty text and ancillary documents to ascertain the ostensible intent of the treaty makers. In the vast
majority of cases, there is nothing in the treaty text, negotiating history, or ratification record that specifies
which domestic legal actors have the power or duty to implement the treaty. Undaunted by the lack of
relevant information, courts invent a fictitious intent of the treaty makers. Thus, the “intent-based”
doctrine of self-execution, commonly called the “Foster doctrine,” promotes the arbitrary exercise of judicial power by encouraging courts to decide cases on the basis of a fictitious intent that the courts themselves
create.
To provide a cogent answer to domestic implementation questions, courts must analyze domestic constitutional and statutory provisions to determine which government officials have the domestic legal authority
and/or duty to implement the treaty. The inquiry necessarily begins with treaty interpretation: courts
cannot properly resolve domestic implementation issues without first ascertaining the nature and scope of the
international obligation. Having determined the content of the international obligation, though, the treaty
interpretation inquiry is complete. The second step of the analysis necessarily moves beyond treaty interpretation to consider domestic laws delineating the powers and duties of various government officials and
institutions. This two-step approach provides the best explanation of Marshall’s opinion in Foster.
The intent-based doctrine is founded on the mistaken view that self-execution is a single question to be
answered by treaty interpretation analysis. In contrast, the two-step approach recognizes that the question
whether a treaty is self-executing is actually two very different questions masquerading as a single question. The two-step approach directs courts to address domestic treaty implementation issues by abandoning
their quest for a fictitious intent of the treaty makers, and considering a variety of domestic constitutional
and statutory provisions that actually address the allocation of domestic authority over treaty
implementation.

Introduction
The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Medellin v. Texas1 unleashed a flood
of new scholarship by the nation’s leading foreign affairs scholars on the
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Global Law and Policy, Santa Clara University
School of Law.
1. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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doctrine of self-executing treaties. The self-execution debate implicates fundamental constitutional questions about federalism, separation of powers,
and individual rights. Partisans in that debate tend to divide into two
camps: nationalists and transnationalists. Nationalists generally favor nonself-execution; they advocate a limited judicial role in the domestic application of treaties, especially insofar as private parties invoke treaties as a constraint on federal, state, or local government actors.2 Transnationalists
generally favor self-execution; they advocate a broader role for courts in the
domestic application of treaties.3 In Medellin, the Supreme Court threw its
substantial weight behind the nationalist camp.
Unfortunately, the entire debate about self-execution—in the Supreme
Court and in academia—has been founded on two erroneous assumptions.
First, courts and commentators, be they nationalist or transnationalist, have
assumed that self-execution is a treaty interpretation question. Second, they
have assumed that the modern doctrine of self-execution is essentially the
same as the doctrine articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in his seminal
1829 opinion in Foster v. Neilson.4 The consensus view is wrong on both
counts.
Properly framed, the self-execution inquiry comprises two distinct questions. First, what does the treaty obligate the United States to do? This is a
question of international law governed by treaty interpretation principles.
Second, which government actors within the United States are responsible
for domestic treaty implementation? This is a question of domestic law, not
international law, and treaties almost never answer this question. Even so,
courts and commentators routinely analyze domestic implementation issues
by examining treaty text and ancillary documents to ascertain the ostensible
intent of the treaty makers.5 In the vast majority of cases, there is nothing in
the treaty text, negotiating history, or ratification record that specifies
which domestic legal actors have the power or duty to implement the
treaty.6 Undaunted by the lack of any relevant information, courts boldly
2. See Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 Sup. Ct. Rev. 131; Paul B. Stephan,
Open Doors, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 11 (2009); Ernest A. Young, Treaties as “Part of Our Law”, 88
Tex. L. Rev. 91 (2009); see also John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution,
and the Original Understanding, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (1999).
3. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 599 (2008); see also Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical
Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2095
(1999); David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1
(2002).
4. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
5. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 504–14; see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 111 cmt. h (1987).
6. Given the variety of national legal systems, it would be virtually impossible for the drafters of a
multilateral treaty to agree on treaty language specifying which domestic government institutions have
the power and/or duty to implement the treaty. See generally National Treaty Law and Practice
(Duncan B. Hollis, Merritt R. Blakeslee & Benjamin Ederington eds., 2005) (surveying treaty law and
practice in nineteen countries); The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: A Com-
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invent a fictitious intent of the treaty makers. Judicial opinions applying the
doctrine are reminiscent of the fable about the emperor’s new clothes. Like
the citizens who pretend to see the emperor’s non-existent clothes, courts
and commentators pretend to find a fictitious intent, even though the treaty
makers did not have any intent regarding the allocation of domestic responsibility for treaty implementation.7 Thus, the “intent-based” doctrine of
self-execution, commonly called the “Foster doctrine,”8 promotes the arbitrary exercise of judicial power by encouraging courts to decide cases on the
basis of a fictitious intent that the courts themselves create.
To provide a cogent answer to domestic implementation questions, courts
must analyze domestic constitutional and statutory provisions to determine
which government officials have the domestic legal authority and/or duty to
implement the treaty. The inquiry necessarily begins with treaty interpretation: courts cannot properly resolve domestic implementation issues without
first ascertaining the nature and scope of the international obligation. Having determined the content of the international obligation, though, the
treaty interpretation inquiry is complete. The second step of the analysis
necessarily moves beyond treaty interpretation to consider domestic laws delineating the powers and duties of various government officials and institutions.9 Although Foster v. Neilson is somewhat cryptic, this two-step
approach provides the best explanation of Marshall’s opinion in Foster.
The intent-based doctrine is founded on the mistaken view that self-execution is a single question to be answered by engaging in a treaty interpretation analysis. In contrast, the two-step approach recognizes that the question
of whether a treaty is self-executing is actually two very different questions
masquerading as a single question. The first question—which concerns the
nature and scope of the international obligation—is a treaty interpretation
question. The second question—which concerns the allocation of responsibility for treaty implementation among various domestic government actors—is not a treaty interpretation question. The two-step approach directs
parative Study (David Sloss ed., 2009) (surveying the role of domestic courts in treaty implementation
in eleven countries).
7. Justice Breyer made a similar point in Medellin. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 549 (2008)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“At best the Court is hunting the snark.”); see also Vázquez, supra note 3, at 607
(noting that a judicial conclusion that the parties intended “to require legislative implementation is
almost certainly attributing to the parties a nonexistent intent”).
8. Professor Vázquez was the first scholar to identify the “Foster doctrine” as a distinct doctrine of selfexecution. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 695,
700–05 (1995). Since then, several other scholars have borrowed his terminology. See, e.g., Young, supra
note 2, at 109–12; David H. Moore, Law(Makers) of the Land: The Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self-Execution,
122 Harv. L. Rev. F. 32 (2009). This Article refers to the modern doctrine or intent-based doctrine of
self-execution to distinguish it from the doctrine courts applied in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. I have shown elsewhere that the intent-based doctrine had virtually no support until after
publication of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law in 1965. See Sloss, supra note 3, at
70–80.
9. In the rare case where the treaty itself, or the Senate resolution of ratification, actually addresses the
question of which domestic government actors are responsible for treaty implementation, the treaty
would be one of several sources courts could consult to answer domestic implementation questions.
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courts to address domestic treaty implementation issues by abandoning their
quest for a fictitious intent of the treaty makers, and considering a variety of
domestic constitutional and statutory provisions that actually address the
allocation of domestic authority over treaty implementation.
If one views self-execution doctrine through the lens of the two-step approach, then a broad range of constitutional treaty issues comes into sharper
focus. The self-execution debate implicates at least four distinct sets of constitutional questions: the relationship between treaties and state law; treatybased delegations of authority to international tribunals; the separation of
lawmaking power between Congress’s Article I powers and the Article II
treaty power; and the division of treaty implementation responsibility between the executive and judicial branches. The two-step approach promises
new insights in analyzing all of these issues, but it is not possible to address
all of them in a single article. This Article focuses on two such issues: the
judicial enforcement of treaties against state government officers (in Part II),
and the delegation of decisionmaking authority to international tribunals (in
Part III).
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties Against the States
The two-step approach helps disentangle domestic from international legal issues, but this is merely the first layer of confusion in self-execution
doctrine. The next layer stems from the persistent failure to distinguish between primary and remedial law concepts of non-self-execution. Under a
primary law concept, non-self-executing treaties do not create domestic legal
duties for government officials, even if they create international duties for
the United States. Under a remedial law concept, private parties may not
demand judicial enforcement of non-self-executing treaties, even though
government officials have a domestic legal duty to implement the treaty.10
Generally, the question of whether a government officer has a legal duty is
analytically prior to the question of how that duty is enforced.11 However,
commentators analyzing non-self-execution doctrine typically bypass the
primary question—whether a treaty creates domestic legal duties for government officers—and jump straight to the remedial question of judicial
enforcement.12 This is like trying to build the second story of a house before
building the ground floor. It is impossible to present a cogent analysis of
judicial enforcement issues without first determining whether the treaty creates domestic legal duties for government officers.13
10. See Sloss, supra note 3, at 10–12 (discussing primary and remedial law concepts of self-execution).
11. Cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 136 (1994) [hereinafter Hart & Sacks].
12. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2 (analyzing judicial enforcement of treaties without analyzing the
analytically prior question of whether, and in what circumstances, treaties create primary duties under
domestic law); Young, supra note 2 (same).
13. This Article focuses primarily on treaties that create legal duties for government officers. The
article says little about private law treaties that regulate transnational relationships between private
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If one frames the question properly in terms of primary duties and asks
whether treaties create primary duties for state government officers, it is
clear that the Supremacy Clause addresses the issue. The Clause stipulates
that treaties are “the supreme Law of the Land.”14 When the United States
ratifies a treaty imposing non-discretionary duties on the nation under international law,15 the Supremacy Clause means that the treaty creates non-discretionary duties for state government officers under domestic law, insofar as
they have the capacity to promote or hinder performance of the nation’s
treaty obligations.16 This was the consensus understanding of the Constitution from the Founding until at least World War II.17 Whatever else the
Supremacy Clause might mean, it must accomplish at least this much: if a
treaty imposing non-discretionary duties on the nation did not create domestic legal duties for state officers who have the capacity to promote or
hinder treaty performance, the statement that treaties are the “supreme Law
of the Land” would be utterly meaningless.18
Assuming that a particular treaty creates non-discretionary duties for
state government officers, the question of judicial enforcement arises. Here
again, modern self-execution doctrine generates unnecessary confusion by
ignoring standard principles of legal analysis. Applying standard principles,
courts would distinguish between civil and criminal proceedings, offensive
and defensive applications of treaty rules, different types of judicial remedies, and numerous other issues. In short, apart from self-execution, courts
and commentators analyze judicial enforcement issues at the retail level, addressing various discrete issues as discrete issues. In contrast, modern selfexecution doctrine addresses judicial enforcement at the wholesale level, asking whether a treaty is “judicially enforceable” without regard to the type of
parties. As a formal matter, non-self-execution doctrine applies equally to both public law and private
law treaties. In practice, however, courts apply non-self-execution doctrine almost exclusively in cases
where private parties invoke treaties as a constraint on government action. See David Sloss, United States,
in The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement, supra note 6, at 504, 534–39.
14. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
15. Under the two-step approach, the question whether a treaty imposes non-discretionary duties on
the United States is a question of international law. Unlike the intent-based doctrine, the two-step
approach clearly distinguishes this question from the issue of which domestic government institution has
the power and/or duty to perform U.S. treaty obligations.
16. This statement is subject to some additional caveats and qualifications. See infra Part II.A.
17. See, e.g., Quincy Wright, The Legal Nature of Treaties, 10 Am. J. Int’l L. 706, 719 (1916) (“The
Government of the United States presumes that whenever a treaty has been duly concluded and ratified
by the acknowledged authorities competent for that purpose, an obligation is thereby imposed upon each
and every department of the Government to carry it into complete effect, according to its terms . . .”)
(quoting an 1831 letter from Secretary of State Livingston to Mr. Serurier); see also Michael P. Van
Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1901-1945, in International Law in the U.S. Supreme court:
Continuity and Change 191 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011)
[hereinafter Continuity and Change]; Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1861-1900, in
Continuity and Change 55; David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, International
Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, in Continuity and Change 7.
18. A distinct question is whether the treaty makers have the power to alter the ordinary operation of
the Supremacy Clause by stipulating that a treaty shall not be binding on state officers until Congress
enacts implementing legislation. See infra notes 188–203 and accompanying text.

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\53-1\HLI103.txt

unknown

Seq: 7

2012 / Executing Foster v. Neilson

13-FEB-12

13:33

141

judicial proceeding, the identity of the litigants, or the nature of relief
sought. If a treaty does not impose non-discretionary duties on government
officers, the wholesale conclusion that the treaty is not judicially enforceable
against those officers is ordinarily justified. However, apart from its decision
in Medellin, the Supreme Court has never recognized the existence of a “law”
that imposes non-discretionary duties on state government officers that is
not enforceable by any litigant in any type of judicial proceeding.19 Thus, if
non-self-execution is construed to bar all avenues for judicial enforcement of
a treaty that imposes non-discretionary duties on government officers, that
doctrine is a constitutional anomaly.
Indeed, modern self-execution doctrine is worse than an anomaly: courts
commit constitutional error when they apply non-self-execution doctrine to
bar judicial enforcement of treaties in cases where the Constitution mandates
judicial enforcement. If a treaty creates domestic legal duties for state officers, an individual alleges that a state government is threatening to subject
him to criminal sanctions in violation of that treaty, and the defendant raises
that argument at the first available opportunity in accordance with state
procedural rules, the Due Process Clause requires the state court to decide
the merits of that defense before the state implements criminal sanctions.
This is not a novel interpretation of the Due Process Clause: it is based on a
traditional understanding of procedural due process whose roots can be
traced to the Magna Carta.20 Insofar as the intent-based doctrine tacitly assumes that the treaty makers have unbounded discretion to bar judicial enforcement of treaties—even in cases where the Due Process Clause mandates
judicial enforcement—that doctrine is unconstitutional.
Delegation of Authority to International Tribunals
The preceding section addressed treaties that, by their terms, create nondiscretionary duties for state government officers. Suppose, though, that a
treaty delegates authority to an international tribunal and that tribunal issues an order requiring state government action. Medellin involved treaties
that delegated authority to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) to
issue decisions binding on the United States under international law.21 The
petitioner in Medellin argued that a state government official had a nondiscretionary duty based on the ICJ’s decision in Avena.22 Thus, Medellin
19. The Supreme Court decision in Medellin might be construed to mean that a non-self-executing
treaty is not a “law” for purposes of domestic law. See Sloss, supra note 13, at 509–14. Under this
interpretation, Medellin is inconsistent with the text of the Supremacy Clause. Hence, scholars who defend Medellin uniformly assume that a non-self-executing treaty is the “Law of the Land” under the
Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2; Stephan, supra note 2; Young, supra note 2. Accordingly, this Article assumes that a non-self-executing treaty is a “law.”
20. See infra Part II.B; see also David Sloss, The Constitutional Right to a Treaty Preemption Defense, 40 U.
Tol. L. Rev. 971, 986–92 (2009).
21. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
22. Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1 (Mar. 31).
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raises the question whether, and under what circumstances, the decision of
an international tribunal creates domestic legal duties for state government
officers. This Article contends that an international tribunal’s decision creates domestic legal duties for state officers when: a valid treaty ratified by
the United States delegates decisionmaking authority to an international
tribunal; that tribunal acts within the scope of delegated authority; the
treaty creates a non-discretionary duty under international law for the nation
to comply with the tribunal’s decision; and state government officers have
the capacity to promote or hinder performance of the nation’s treaty obligations.23 If the decision of an international tribunal creates domestic legal
duties for state officers, those duties are judicially enforceable in the same
way as domestic legal duties based on treaties that do not delegate authority
to international tribunals.
This Article contends that the Supreme Court’s rationale in Medellin is
seriously flawed under any plausible interpretation of the Court’s opinion.
Even so, the Court’s decision manifests legitimate concerns about policy issues related to treaty-based international delegations.24 The Court might
have presented a more coherent rationale for its decision had it confronted
the international delegation issues directly, instead of avoiding the main
issues by relying on an incoherent non-self-execution rationale. This Article
confronts the international delegation issues that the Court dodged in Medellin; it recommends a set of reservations and declarations that treaty makers
can use to limit the international and domestic effects of treaty-based delegations in future treaties.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part One explains and defends the
two-step approach to self-execution. It demonstrates that the two-step approach provides the best explanation of Marshall’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson, and that the two-step approach is analytically and normatively superior
to the intent-based doctrine. Parts Two and Three utilize the two-step approach to analyze two recurring issues of constitutional treaty law. Part Two
addresses judicial enforcement of treaties against state government officers.
Part Three addresses treaty-based delegations of authority to international
tribunals. Part Four presents a critical assessment of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Medellin.

23. To be precise, the proposed rule is subject to anti-commandeering limitations and subject to the
caveat that the treaty makers have the power to alter the ordinary operation of the Supremacy Clause by
adopting appropriate conditions. See infra notes 223–34 and accompanying text.
24. See John O. McGinnis, Medellin and the Future of International Delegation, 118 Yale L.J. 1712
(2009) (analyzing policy issues associated with treaty-based international delegations).
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I. The Two-Step Approach to Self-Execution
Contemporary legal scholarship is virtually unanimous in the belief that
Marshall’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson25 applied the intent-based doctrine of
self-execution.26 Courts applying the intent-based doctrine view self-execution as a treaty-interpretation question; they examine the treaty text and
ancillary materials to ascertain whether the treaty makers intended the
treaty to be self-executing.27 Part I demonstrates that Marshall did not apply
the intent-based approach in Foster. The analysis draws on eighteenth and
nineteenth century sources—some of which have been completely overlooked by other scholars—to show that Marshall applied the two-step approach in Foster. Under the two-step approach, courts first engage in treaty
interpretation to ascertain the nature and scope of the international obligation. Then, at step two, they analyze domestic law to determine which government actors have the power and duty to implement the treaty
domestically. Thus, step one focuses on international obligations; step two
focuses on domestic implementation.
The first section analyzes eighteenth and nineteenth century sources that
provide crucial historical context to uncover the hidden rationale underlying
Marshall’s enigmatic opinion in Foster. The second section presents a detailed analysis of Marshall’s opinions in Foster and United States v.
Percheman.28 The final section explains why the two-step approach is analytically and normatively superior to the intent-based approach.
A. Historical Context
Section II.A considers three sets of sources from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that help shed light on Marshall’s opinion in Foster: the
Supreme Court decision in Ware v. Hylton;29 congressional debates on the Jay
Treaty and the Jonathan Robbins case; and Supreme Court decisions between 1830 and 1855 relating to land claims in Louisiana and Florida. The
analysis demonstrates that—from the late eighteenth century until the Civil
War—members of Congress and Supreme Court Justices agreed that the
question of whether a treaty requires legislative implementation was properly understood as a question of domestic constitutional law, not as a question of treaty interpretation. The modern assumption that Marshall
25. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
26. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2; Vázquez, supra note 3; Young, supra note 2.
27. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–14 (2008); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 16
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 549 F.3d 605,
615–16 (3d Cir. 2008); Renkel v. United States, 456 F.3d 640, 643–44 (6th Cir. 2006); Cantor v.
Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 207 (4th Cir. 2006) (Traxler, J., dissenting); Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 377–78
(7th Cir. 2005); see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 111 cmt. h (1987).
28. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
29. 3 U.S. 199 (1796).
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conceived of this question as a treaty interpretation question reflects a failure
to understand the intellectual universe of the early nineteenth century.
1. Ware v. Hylton
Ware v. Hylton was one of the first Supreme Court decisions addressing the
domestic implementation of treaties. Before becoming Chief Justice, Marshall served as lead counsel for the defendants in Ware.30 The Court ruled
against Marshall’s client; Justice Iredell was the only Justice who would
have ruled in Marshall’s favor. Thus, Iredell’s opinion provides an important
benchmark for understanding Marshall’s early thinking about treaty implementation. Moreover, Iredell’s opinion provides a lucid explanation of the
doctrine of executory and executed treaties that Marshall applied three decades later in Foster.
In Ware, a British creditor sued American debtors to collect a debt incurred before the Revolutionary War. The defendants answered that they
discharged part of the debt by paying money into a state loan office in
accordance with Virginia law.31 In reply, the plaintiff invoked Article 4 of
the 1783 peace treaty with Britain, which provided that “[c]reditors on
either Side shall meet with no lawful Impediment to the Recovery . . . of all
bona fide Debts heretofore contracted.”32 The Court ruled in favor of the
British plaintiff, holding that the treaty removed any bar to recovery created
by Virginia law. Justice Cushing wrote that under the Supremacy Clause, a
treaty “overrules all State laws upon the subject.”33 The other Justices
agreed on this point,34 including Justice Iredell, who dissented on other
grounds.35 Although Marshall argued eloquently on behalf of the losing defendants,36 he never challenged the consensus view that under the
Supremacy Clause, the treaty displaced any state law inconsistent with U.S.
treaty obligations.
Relying on Blackstone’s parallel distinction for contracts,37 Justice Iredell
distinguished between executory and executed treaty provisions.38 Executed
treaty provisions “require no further act to be done.”39 Iredell cited Britain’s
30. See 7 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 17891800, at 215–17 (Maeva Marcus ed., 2003) [hereinafter 7 DHSC].
31. See Ware, 3 U.S. at 220–21.
32. Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 4, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
33. Ware, 3 U.S. at 282 (Cushing, J.).
34. See id. at 236–37 (Chase, J.) (implying that, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, “a law of a State,
contrary to a treaty” is void).
35. See id. at 277 (Iredell, J.) (“[W]hen this constitution was ratified, the case as to the treaty in
question stood upon the same footing, as if every [state law] constituting an impediment to a creditor’s
recovery had been expressly repealed, and any further act passed, which the public obligation had before
required, if a repeal alone would not have been sufficient.”).
36. See id. at 210–15 (Marshall’s argument).
37. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *443.
38. Ware, 3 U.S. at 271–73 (Iredell, J.).
39. Id. at 272.
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acknowledgment of U.S. independence as an example of an executed provision. In contrast, executory provisions require the nation to undertake affirmative steps to fulfill its treaty commitments. Iredell divided executory
treaty provisions into three classes: legislative, executive, and judicial.40 In
his view, “when a nation promises to do a thing, it is to be understood, that
this promise is to be carried into execution, in the manner which the Constitution of that nation prescribes.”41 Thus, Iredell’s analytic framework involves a two-step analysis. In step one, the court analyzes the treaty to
determine whether the provision is executory or executed. If it is executory,
the second step entails a domestic separation of powers analysis to determine
whether treaty implementation requires judicial, executive, or legislative
action.
To fully understand Iredell’s two-step approach, it is essential to grasp the
conceptual distinction between an executory treaty provision and a non-selfexecuting provision. The statement that a treaty is “non-self-executing”
means that congressional legislation is necessary to implement the treaty; if
the treaty is “self-executing,” no such legislation is needed.42 The statement
that a treaty is “executory” means that some affirmative action is necessary
to implement the treaty; if a treaty is “executed,” no affirmative action is
required. Thus, all non-self-executing treaty provisions are executory, but
not all executory provisions are non-self-executing, because some executory
treaty provisions can be implemented by executive or judicial action.
It bears emphasis that, under Iredell’s two-step approach, Article 4 of the
1783 peace treaty was an executory treaty provision that required judicial
implementation. Article 4 was executory because it required the United
States to take affirmative steps to ensure that British creditors recovered
their debts. Although Article 4 was executory, it did not require legislative
implementation. The Court held that judicial action was the appropriate
means to implement the treaty because the combination of the treaty and
the Supremacy Clause obligated state courts to “execute” the U.S. treaty
obligation by ordering American debtors to pay their debts to British
creditors.
2. Congressional Debates on Treaty Implementation
At about the same time that the Supreme Court decided Ware, members
of Congress were debating proposed legislation to implement the Jay
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Although the terms “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” are ambiguous, there is general
agreement that the distinction hinges on whether the treaty requires legislative implementation. The
ambiguity involves what it means to say that legislation is “necessary.” Is legislation necessary to incorporate the treaty into domestic law? Or are non-self-executing treaties part of domestic law, but legislation is necessary to authorize judicial enforcement?
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Treaty,43 one of the most controversial treaties in the nation’s early history.44
During congressional debates, Federalists and Republicans staked out opposing positions on the need for legislation to implement treaties.45 Republicans claimed that all treaties “that fell within the enumerated legislative
powers of Congress” required legislative implementation to become effective
as domestic law.46 In contrast, Federalists argued that “treaties automatically become law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause [and] they also ‘repealed’ or ‘annulled’ prior inconsistent federal statutes.”47 Most Federalists
acknowledged that a treaty could not appropriate funds, but they claimed
that Congress had a constitutional duty to appropriate funds whenever that
was necessary to implement a treaty.48 Despite deep divisions between Federalists and Republicans, all agreed that the question whether treaties required legislative implementation was a constitutional law question, not a
treaty interpretation question. Ultimately, Congress enacted an appropriations bill to fund implementation of the Jay Treaty, but “the episode ended
in a standoff on the constitutional questions.”49
Just four years later, Congress resumed the debate about the Constitution
and treaty implementation when Republicans introduced a formal resolution
criticizing President Adams’ handling of the so-called “Jonathan Robbins
affair.”50 The Robbins affair is noteworthy because Chief Justice Marshall,
then serving as a Congressman from Virginia, delivered an important speech
in the House of Representatives presenting a constitutional defense of President Adams’ actions.51 Marshall’s speech set forth his views about the allocation of constitutional responsibility for treaty implementation among the
three branches of the federal government.52 In brief, Marshall believed that
all government officers have a duty to execute treaties, insofar as they can do
so by acting within the scope of authority granted under domestic law.

43. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116 [hereinafter Jay Treaty]. The Court decided Ware in March 1796. See Dates of Early Supreme Court Decisions
and Arguments, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/opinions.aspx. Congress debated the
Jay Treaty in March and April 1796. See 5 Annals of Cong. 424–1295 (1796).
44. Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers
(1970) (analyzing the history and debates surrounding the Jay Treaty controversy); Samuel Flagg
Bemis, Jay’s Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy (2d ed. 1962) (discussing the history,
creation and ratification of the Jay Treaty).
45. See 5 Annals of Cong. 424–1295 (1796). For an excellent summary of the debate, see John T.
Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause and the Implementation of Treaties, 32 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1209,
1276–94 (2009).
46. See Parry, supra note 45, at 1281–83 (citing statements by Representatives Gallatin and Giles).
47. Id. at 1284.
48. See id. at 1281–84.
49. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789-1801, at
215 (1997).
50. See 10 Annals of Cong. 532–33 (resolution by Representative Livingston on Feb. 20, 1800).
51. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Taking Care of John Marshall’s Political Ghost, 53 St. Louis U. L.J. 93
(2008) (discussing Marshall’s role in the Robbins affair).
52. See 10 Annals of Cong. 596, 605–15 (1800).
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The Robbins case arose when British authorities sought the extradition of
Jonathan Robbins on the charge that he committed murder on a British
warship.53 Under Article 27 of the Jay Treaty,54 the United States agreed to
extradite fugitives to Britain if certain conditions were satisfied.55 British
authorities asked Thomas Bee, the federal district judge in South Carolina,
to order Robbins’ extradition. When Judge Bee refused, the British approached Secretary of State Timothy Pickering. After consulting with President Adams, Pickering sent Judge Bee a letter conveying the President’s
“advice and request that [Robbins] may be delivered up to the consul or
other agent of Great Britain.”56 After receiving Pickering’s letter, Judge Bee
ordered Robbins to be delivered to British authorities,57 and the government
proceeded to extradite him.
Consistent with Republican positions in the Jay Treaty debates, Republicans argued that President Adams acted improperly because he lacked the
constitutional authority to extradite Robbins until Congress enacted legislation implementing Article 27.58 Marshall agreed that Congress “may prescribe the mode, and Congress may devolve on others the whole execution of
the contract; but, till this be done, it seems the duty of the Executive department to execute the contract by any means it possesses.”59 Marshall explained this position as follows: “[The President] is charged to execute the
laws. A treaty is declared to be a law. He must then execute a treaty, where
he . . . possesses the means of executing it.”60 Since Article 27 had the force
of law under the Supremacy Clause, and the President had a duty under
Article II to execute the law, the President had a duty to execute Article 27,
at least in cases where Congress had not specified some other mechanism for
treaty implementation.
Republicans also argued that Article 27 required judicial, not executive
implementation.61 In response, Marshall emphasized the distinction between
a case “carried before a court as an individual claim” and a case “brought
before the Executive as a national demand.”62 The Robbins case was “in its
nature a national demand made upon the nation. The parties were the two
nations. They cannot come into court to litigate their claims, nor can a court
53. See Van Alstine, supra note 51.
54. Jay Treaty, supra note 43, art. 27.
55. See id.
56. Letter from Timothy Pickering to Thomas Bee (June 3, 1799), in 4 State Papers and Publick
Documents of the United States 304 (2d ed., Boston, T.B. Wait & Sons 1817).
57. See United States v. Robbins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 833 (D.S.C. 1799).
58. 10 Annals of Cong. 614 (1800).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 615.
61. Id. at 606. It is noteworthy that Marshall’s Republican opponents thought the judiciary could
execute the treaty without waiting for legislative authorization, but the executive had to await legislative
authorization before implementing the treaty. This is precisely the opposite of the view espoused by
many modern scholars, who think that the President can execute treaties on his own authority, but the
courts must await legislative implementation. See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 2.
62. 10 Annals of Cong. 609.
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decide on them. Of consequence, the demand is not a case for judicial cognizance.”63 A treaty-related claim falls within the scope of judicial competence
where parties “come into court, who can be reached by its process, and
bound by its power . . . to which they are bound to submit.”64 Since the real
parties in interest in the Robbins case were two sovereign powers, and they
were not bound to submit to judicial authority, the case fell outside the
scope of judicial competence.
In Marshall’s view, cases in which individuals raise claims under treaties
fall within the scope of judicial competence. “A case in law or equity proper
for judicial decision may arise under a treaty, where the rights of individuals
acquired or secured by a treaty are to be asserted or defended in court.”65 In
particular, Marshall noted, in cases where the government arrests a person
pursuant to an extradition request and that person alleges that he has been
wrongfully detained, the individual can raise a claim under the extradition
treaty by filing a habeas corpus petition.66 Robbins himself sought habeas
relief in precisely these circumstances and no one challenged the judiciary’s
authority to adjudicate the merits of his petition.67 Thus, in Marshall’s view,
judges have a duty to execute treaties whenever treaty-related questions fall
within the scope of judicial competence, just as executive officers have a
duty to execute treaties whenever treaty issues are within the scope of their
competence. Moreover, the scope of judicial and executive authority is governed by domestic law, not international law.
All congressional participants in the Robbins debate agreed that Article
27 was executory—i.e., the United States had to take affirmative steps to
implement Article 27. But this did not mean that legislation was required.
To the contrary, the congressional debate focused almost exclusively on the
question whether the judiciary or the executive was the appropriate branch
to execute the treaty. Thus, consistent with Justice Iredell’s opinion in Ware,
the consensus view was that some executory treaty provisions require judicial implementation, and some executory provisions require executive
implementation.
Finally, all participants in the Robbins debate agreed that constitutional
law, not international law, determines which branch of government is responsible for treaty implementation. In Marshall’s words, the distribution of
power among the branches is governed by “the principles of the American
63. Id. at 613.
64. Id. at 606.
65. Id. See also Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.)
(“Each treaty stipulates something respecting the citizens of the two nations, and gives them rights.
Whenever a right grows out of, or is protected by, a treaty, it is sanctioned against all the laws and
judicial decisions of the states; and whoever may have this right, it is to be protected.”).
66. 10 Annals of Cong. 615 (“And if the President should cause to be arrested under the treaty an
individual who was so circumstanced as not to be properly the object of such an arrest, he may perhaps
bring the question of the legality of his arrest before a judge, by a writ of habeas corpus.”).
67. See United States v. Robbins, 27 F. Cas. at 833.
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Government.”68 Marshall acknowledged that explicit treaty language providing for a specific mode of treaty implementation would have controlling
effect.69 However, in the absence of such explicit treaty language, constitutional separation-of-powers principles determine which branch of government has the power and/or duty to implement a particular treaty provision.
3. Land Claims in Louisiana and Florida
By 1820, the United States had concluded two major treaties involving
acquisition of land from foreign powers: the 1803 treaty acquiring Louisiana
from France70 and the 1819 treaty acquiring Florida from Spain.71 Article 3
of the Louisiana Treaty and Article 8 of the Florida Treaty protected the
property rights of individuals who owned land in the subject territories
before the transfer of sovereignty.72 The Court interpreted both provisions to
provide identical protection for individual property rights. Foster involved
Article 8 of the Florida Treaty.
The Court decided Foster in 1829; over the next three decades, the Court
decided at least seventy-five other cases entailing application of Article 8 of
the Florida Treaty and/or Article 3 of the Louisiana Treaty.73 Other scholars
68. 10 Annals of Cong. 615.
69. See id. at 608 (comparing the Consular Convention with France, which specified a particular mode
of treaty implementation, with Article 27 of the treaty with Britain, which contained no such provision).
70. Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200 [hereinafter Louisiana
Treaty].
71. Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252 [hereinafter
Florida Treaty].
72. See id., art. 8; Louisiana Treaty, supra note 70, art. 3.
73. One source indicates that the Supreme Court decided “some fifty cases” involving the Louisiana
Treaty and “about fifty Florida cases.” Homer Cummings & Carl McFarland, Federal Justice:
Chapters in the History of Justice and the Federal Executive 124–25 (1937). Their figures
may include some cases decided after 1860. The author identified seventy-five cases decided between
1829 and 1859. See Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635 (1853); Guitard v. Stoddard, 57 U.S. 494 (1853);
Chouteau v. Molony, 57 U.S. 203 (1853); United States v. Roselius, 56 U.S. 31 (1853); United States v.
Davenport’s Heirs, 56 U.S. 1 (1853); Glenn v. United States, 54 U.S. 250 (1851); United States v.
Pillerin, 54 U.S. 9 (1851); United States v. Castant, 53 U.S. 437 (1851); United States v. Moore, 53 U.S.
209 (1851); Montault v. United States, 53 U.S. 47 (1851); United States v. Cities of Philadelphia & New
Orleans, 52 U.S. 609 (1850); United States v. Power’s Heirs, 52 U.S. 570 (1850); United States v.
Boisdoré, 52 U.S. 63 (1850); Robinson v. Minor, 51 U.S. 627 (1850); United States v. D’Auterive, 51
U.S. 609 (1850); Villalobus v. United States, 51 U.S. 541 (1850); Goodtitle ex dem Pollard v. Kibbe, 50
U.S. 471 (1850); Davis v. Police Jury of the Parish of Concordia, 50 U.S. 280 (1850); La Roche v. Lessee
of Jones, 50 U.S. 155 (1850); United States v. Reynes, 50 U.S. 127 (1850); Almonester v. Kenton, 50
U.S. 1 (1850); Bissell v. Penrose, 49 U.S. 317 (1850); Menard’s Heirs v. Massey, 49 U.S. 293 (1850);
United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 49 U.S. 113 (1850); United States v. King, 48 U.S. 833 (1849);
Kennedy’s Executors v. Hunt’s Lessee, 48 U.S. 586 (1849); United States v. Lawton, 46 U.S. 10 (1847);
Les Bois v. Bramell, 45 U.S. 449 (1846); Mackay v. Dillon, 45 U.S. 421 (1846); Lessee of Hickey v.
Stewart, 44 U.S. 750 (1845); McDonogh v. Millaudon, 44 U.S. 693 (1845); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S.
212 (1845); Barry v. Gamble, 44 U.S. 32 (1845); Lessee of Pollard v. Files, 43 U.S. 591 (1844);
Chouteau v. Eckhart, 43 U.S. 344 (1844); Stoddard v. Chambers, 43 U.S. 284 (1844); City of Mobile v.
Emanuel, 42 U.S. 95 (1843); United States v. Acosta, 42 U.S. 24 (1843); City of Mobile v. Hallett, 41
U.S. 261 (1842); City of Mobile v. Eslava, 41 U.S. 234 (1842); United States v. Clarke, 41 U.S. 228
(1842); United States v. Hanson, 41 U.S. 196 (1842); United States v. Miranda, 41 U.S. 153 (1842);
United States v. Breward, 41 U.S. 143 (1842); United States v. Delespine, 40 U.S. 319 (1841); O’Hara v.
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who have written about the historical origins of the self-execution doctrine
have generally overlooked the Louisiana and Florida property cases,74 but
one cannot properly interpret Marshall’s opinions in Foster and Percheman
without understanding those cases. The property claims presented in those
cases can be divided into three groups: claims involving perfected titles;
claims involving inchoate titles based on legally valid grants; and claims
involving grants from a government representative who lacked authority to
convey a valid legal title.75 The characterization of the relevant treaty provisions as “executory” or “executed” depended, in large part, on the nature of
the property interests at stake in a particular case.76
If a person held a perfected title to real property before the effective date
of the treaty, he retained his title when sovereignty passed to the United
States. The United States had no obligation to take affirmative steps to perfect such already-perfect titles.77 As Justice Catron explained, “[t]hat the
perfect titles, made by Spain, before the 24th January, 1818, within the
ceded territory, are intrinsically valid . . . is the established doctrine of this
Court; and that they need no sanction from the legislative or judicial departments of this country.”78 Article 8 of the Florida Treaty and Article 3 of the
Louisiana Treaty—as applied to perfect titles—were “executed,” not “exec-

United States, 40 U.S. 275 (1841); United States v. Heirs of Forber, 40 U.S. 173 (1841); Mitchel v.
United States, 40 U.S. 52 (1841); United States v. Waterman, 39 U.S. 478 (1840); Lessee of Pollard’s
Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353 (1840); United States v. Wiggins, 39 U.S. 334 (1840); Keene v. Whitaker,
39 U.S. 170 (1840); United States v. Levy, 38 U.S. 81 (1839); Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. 511 (1838); United
States v. Kingsley, 37 U.S. 476 (1838); Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. 410 (1838); United States v. Mills’
Heirs, 37 U.S. 215 (1838); Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662 (1836); Mackey v.
United States, 35 U.S. 340 (1836); Smith v. United States, 35 U.S. 326 (1836); United States v. Sibbald,
35 U.S. 313 (1836); United States v. Seton, 35 U.S. 309 (1836); United States v. Fernandez, 35 U.S. 303
(1836); Keene v. Clark’s Heirs, 35 U.S. 291 (1836); Soulard’s Heirs v. United States, 35 U.S. 100
(1836); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711 (1835); City of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. 224
(1835); United States v. Clarke, 34 U.S. 168 (1835); Delassus v. United States, 34 U.S. 117 (1835);
United States v. Huertas, 33 U.S. 488 (1834); United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. 436 (1834); United States
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833); United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 691 (1832); Soulard v. United
States, 29 U.S. 511 (1830); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
74. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2; Flaherty, supra note 3; Parry, supra note 45; Vazquez, supra note 3;
Yoo, supra note 2. But see Sloss, Ramsey & Dodge, International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, supra
note 17, at 18–23.
75. The Court used the terms “perfect,” “complete,” and “legal” title interchangeably, distinguishing sharply between this class of property rights and “inchoate,” “incomplete,” or “equitable” titles,
terms it also used interchangeably.
76. It is noteworthy that the Court never used the term “self-executing” or “non-self-executing” to
modify the term “treaty” in any of the Louisiana/Florida property cases. Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S.
116, 120 (1887) was the first case in which the Court used the term “self-executing” to refer to treaties.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Roselius, 56 U.S. at 34 (“If the grant of the French government to
Duport was a complete title, then no act on the part of the American government was required to give it
additional validity, as the treaty of 1803, by which Louisiana was acquired, sanctioned perfect titles[.]”);
McDonogh, 44 U.S. at 706 (“The perfect title of McDonogh being clothed with the highest sanction,
and in full property, on the change of governments . . . in addition to the general law of nations and the
treaty of 1803 . . . secured in full property such titles.”).
78. United States v. Wiggins, 39 U.S. 334, 350 (1840).
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utory,” because the United States did not have to take any affirmative steps
to implement its treaty obligation to respect perfected property rights.79
The second class of cases under the Florida and Louisiana treaties involved
inchoate titles based on legally valid grants. As the Court noted, “there were
at the date of the treaty very many claims, whose validity depended upon
the performance of conditions in consideration of which the concessions had
been made, and which must have been performed before Spain was bound to
perfect the titles.”80 If a person held an inchoate title before the effective
date of the treaty, “the fee [i.e., the legal title] was transferred to the United
States by the treaty, with the equity attached in the claimant.”81 The relevant treaty provisions obligated the United States to convert such imperfect
titles (i.e., equitable claims) into perfect titles (i.e., legal titles), but only
insofar as the prior sovereign was obligated to perfect the title of that particular claimant.82 With respect to these claimants, Article 8 of the Florida
Treaty and Article 3 of the Louisiana Treaty were executory, not executed,
because the United States had to take affirmative steps to perfect these inchoate titles.
The Supreme Court stated in several cases that federal legislation was
required to perfect the titles of claimants who held inchoate titles at the
time sovereignty passed to the United States, because Congress was the only
branch of government with the constitutional authority to convert inchoate
titles into perfect titles.83 It bears emphasis that such statements presuppose
a two-step approach. First, the Court determined as a matter of treaty interpretation that a particular treaty required conversion of inchoate titles to
79. It is helpful here to distinguish between two types of “affirmative steps.” In some cases, affirmative judicial action is necessary to resolve a treaty-related dispute between two private parties. Such
disputes might arise with respect to either executed or executory treaty provisions. For example, if a
private party trespassed on land for which another person held a perfect title, the judiciary might need to
take affirmative steps to protect the owner’s title, even though the title is protected by an executed treaty
provision. In contrast, some treaties obligate the United States to take affirmative steps even in the
absence of any dispute between private parties. Such treaties are “executory” in the sense in which Iredell
(and Blackstone) used that term.
80. Wiggins, 39 U.S. at 350.
81. McDonogh, 44 U.S. at 706. See also Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. 410, 436 (1838) (explaining that an
“inchoate” or “equitable” title was a property right, “which before the treaty with France in 1803, or
with Spain in 1819, had so attached to any piece or tract of land, great or small, as to affect the conscience of the former sovereign, ‘with a trust,’ and make him a trustee for an individual”).
82. See Wiggins, 39 U.S. at 350 (stating that “the United States were bound, after the cession of the
country, to the same extent that Spain had been bound before the ratification of the treaty, to perfect”
these inchoate titles); see also Chouteau v. Eckhart, 43 U.S. 344, 374 (1844); Florida Treaty, supra note
71, art. 8, Feb. 22, 1819, 11 Bevans 528, 531 (“All the grants of land made before the 24th of January
1818 . . . shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent, that
the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the Dominion of His Catholic Majesty.”)
(emphasis added).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Reynes, 50 U.S. 127, 153 (1850) (“And it has been invariably held, and
indeed must follow as of necessity, that imperfect titles derived from a foreign government can only be
perfected by the legislation of the United States.”); Menard’s Heirs v. Massey, 49 U.S. 293, 307 (1850)
(“It was therefore manifest, that . . . [inchoate titles] must depend for their sanction and completion
upon the sovereign power . . . No standing, therefore, in an ordinary judicial tribunal has ever been
allowed to these claims, until Congress has confirmed them and vested the legal title in the claimant.”).
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perfect titles. Second, the Court decided as a matter of U.S. constitutional
law that federal legislation was needed to implement that obligation. The
Court did not clearly articulate this view until 1844,84 fifteen years after its
decision in Foster. Nevertheless, as explained below, the doctrine that federal
legislation was constitutionally required to convert inchoate titles into perfect titles helps clarify the rationale underlying Marshall’s opinion in
Foster.85
The third class of cases involved grants made by government representatives who lacked authority to convey legal title because the grant was made
after the date on which the grantor’s government signed a treaty ceding the
territory to a different sovereign.86 In some of these cases, the Court held
that the grant was void because the government that issued the grant lacked
authority to do so.87 In other cases, though, the Court held that claimants
had an equitable claim (i.e., an inchoate title) because they inhabited land
on the basis of a good faith belief that the government granting the land had
the authority to do so.88 In several cases, Congress enacted legislation to
validate the property claims of individuals in this group. The Court ruled in
favor of claimants who could point to such legislation to support their
claims,89 but it never ruled in favor of any claimant who merely asserted an
equitable claim unsupported by such legislation.
In sum, with respect to claimants who held perfect legal titles, Article 8
of the Florida Treaty and Article 3 of the Louisiana Treaty were executed,
not executory. However, with respect to claimants who held inchoate titles,
the same treaty provisions were executory, and Congress was the only institution with the domestic constitutional authority to execute U.S. treaty ob84. See Chouteau v. Eckhart, 43 U.S. 344, 374–75 (1844).
85. The Court’s view that legislation was necessary to perfect inchoate titles was entirely consistent
with Marshall’s theory in Robbins. Marshall’s theory was that every government officer has a duty to
execute treaties, insofar as treaty implementation measures fall within the scope of his competence. In the
Louisiana and Florida cases, the Court held that Congress is the only government institution with the
constitutional authority to convert inchoate titles into perfect titles. Therefore, federal judicial and executive officials could not execute the relevant treaty provisions, because judicial and executive officers
lacked the constitutional authority to convert inchoate titles into perfect titles.
86. Portions of the territory conveyed to the United States by the 1803 Louisiana Treaty and the 1819
Florida Treaty had previously been traded among France, Spain, and Britain in a series of treaties concluded between 1763 and 1800. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 300–03 (1829). Several of the
Louisiana-Florida property cases that reached the Supreme Court involved land granted by a representative of one of these governments after the grantor’s government had already ceded sovereignty to another
country.
87. See, e.g., Keene v. Whitaker, 39 U.S. 170 (1840); Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. 511 (1838).
88. See, e.g., Lessee of Pollard v. Files, 43 U.S. 591, 603 (1844) (“Very many permits to settle on the
public domain and cultivate, were also granted about the same time; which were in form incipient
concessions of the land, and intended by the governor to give title, and to receive confirmation afterwards
from the king’s deputy, so as to perfect them into a complete title. . . . Although the United States
disavowed that any right to the soil, passed by such concessions; still they were not disregarded as giving
no equity to the claimant: on the contrary. . . .” [explaining how Congress passed legislation to recognize
equitable claims]).
89. See Lessee of Pollard v. Files, 43 U.S. 591 (1844); Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353
(1840).
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ligations. Finally, with respect to grants made by government
representatives who lacked authority to convey legal title, the Court sometimes held that such grants were void and sometimes held that such grants
gave rise to equitable claims, which required congressional sanction before
they could be enforced in court. In every case where the issue arose, the
Court’s analysis proceeded on the basis of the same assumption that shaped
congressional debates: whether a treaty requires legislative implementation
is a domestic constitutional question, not a treaty interpretation question.
B. Application of the Two-Step Approach in Foster and Percheman
In Foster v. Neilson,90 Marshall penned the following words, which have
come to be associated with the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is,
consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to
an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the
aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political,
not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the
contract before it can become a rule for the Court.91
Marshall clearly believed that legislation was necessary to implement Article
8 of the Florida Treaty, but it is unclear why. The dominant contemporary
interpretation asserts that, under the Foster doctrine of non-self-execution,
“the need for implementing legislation has its source in the treaty itself.”92
Under this view, Marshall’s conclusion that Article 8 required legislative
implementation rested entirely on a treaty interpretation analysis, not a separation of powers analysis.93 Moreover, under the conventional view, Marshall reversed himself in United States v. Percheman94 and held—again as a
matter of treaty interpretation—that Article 8 did not require legislative
implementation.95
This section contends that this conventional interpretation is mistaken.
From Marshall’s perspective, the key factor that distinguished Percheman
from Foster was the nature of the property interest at stake. The plaintiffs in
Foster traced their title to a grant that was void ab initio because the grantor
lacked authority to convey title. Hence, the plaintiffs at best had an equitable claim to the land. They needed congressional action to validate their
title because Congress was the only branch of government with the constitu90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
Id. at 314.
Vázquez, supra note 3, at 631.
See id. at 629–37.
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
See Vázquez, supra note 3, at 644–45. See also Restatement, supra note 5, § 111 n.5.

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\53-1\HLI103.txt

154

unknown

Seq: 20

13-FEB-12

13:33

Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 53

tional authority to convert inchoate titles into perfect titles. In contrast,
Percheman held title “in absolute property” based on a valid grant from the
Spanish governor of Florida.96 Thus, in Marshall’s view, legislation was not
necessary to validate Percheman’s title because he already had a perfect title
before Spain conveyed Florida to the United States.
1. The Property Interests at Stake in Foster and Percheman
Marshall explained in Foster how France, Spain, Britain and the United
States concluded a series of treaties over several decades in which they traded
various portions of Florida and Louisiana among themselves.97 It is not necessary to recount the full history here, but knowledge of certain facts is
essential to understand the Court’s decisions in Foster and Percheman. The
land at issue in Percheman was in East Florida,98 in an area subject to undisputed Spanish sovereignty from 1783 until 1819. In contrast, the land at
issue in Foster was east of the Mississippi River and west of the Perdido River
(in what is now southeastern Louisiana), an area that was the subject of
competing sovereignty claims between 1800 and 1819. The United States
maintained that Spain ceded land west of the Perdido to France by means of
an 1800 treaty, and that France had ceded it to the United States as part of
the 1803 Louisiana Purchase.99 Spain, however, contended that land between the Mississippi and Perdido Rivers was part of Spanish Florida until
1819, when the United States acquired Florida from Spain.100
Percheman traced his title to an 1815 grant from the Spanish governor of
Florida, a grant made when Spain exercised undisputed sovereignty over
East Florida.101 The Spanish governor conveyed title to Percheman “in absolute property.”102 Thus, in terms of the tri-partite division of cases noted
above, Percheman fits in the class of cases involving perfected titles. The
plaintiffs in Foster, in contrast, traced their title to an 1804 grant from the
Spanish governor of Florida,103 a grant made when the United States already
claimed sovereignty over land west of the Perdido by virtue of the 1803
Louisiana Purchase. The Foster Court held that, in 1804, the Spanish governor lacked authority to convey legal title to the property because the land at
issue was already part of the United States.104 Thus, Foster falls squarely
within the class of cases involving grants made by government representatives who lacked authority to convey legal title.
96. See Percheman, 32 U.S. at 54–56.
97. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 300–03 (1829).
98. See Percheman, 32 U.S. at 54–56.
99. See David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the
Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas, 45 Colum. J. Trans’l L. 20, 79–83 (2006).
100. See id.
101. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 54–56 (1833).
102. Id.
103. Foster, 27 U.S. at 253–55.
104. Id. at 300–09.
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As noted above, cases where the grantor lacked authority to convey title
can be further sub-divided into two groups: those where the grant was simply void, and those where the grant gave rise to an equitable claim.105 The
Foster Court divided precisely along these lines. “The majority of the
Court,” said Marshall, believed that Spanish grants of land west of the
Perdido after 1803 were simply “void.”106 In contrast, Marshall wrote,
“[o]ne other judge and myself are inclined to adopt” the opinion that imperfect grants for land west of the Perdido “were as obligatory on the
United States, as on his catholic majesty.”107 In other words, Marshall
thought the plaintiffs had an equitable claim to the property. In a subsequent case involving a Spanish grant of land west of the Perdido, the Court
expressed the idea as follows: “Although the United States disavowed that
any right to the soil, passed by such concessions; still they were not disregarded as giving no equity to the claimant.”108 The Court explained that an
“inchoate” or “equitable” title was a property right that “had so attached to
any piece or tract of land . . . as to affect the conscience of the former sovereign, ‘with a trust,’ and make him a trustee for an individual.”109 Thus, in
Marshall’s view, under Article 8 of the Florida treaty, the United States
inherited Spain’s position as a “trustee” for individuals, like the plaintiffs in
Foster, who had equitable claims to property based on Spanish grants. Those
grants did not convey legal title, but they nevertheless affected “the conscience of the former sovereign with a trust.”
2. The Law of Nations and Individual Property Rights
Before undertaking a treaty interpretation analysis in Percheman, Marshall
explained the background principles of the law of nations (i.e., international
law) that apply when territory is passed from one sovereign to another. In
his view, the law of nations ensured that individuals who held perfected
titles to land retained those titles when a sovereign conveyed the surrounding territory to a different sovereign.
[I]t is very unusual, even in cases of conquest, for the conqueror to
do more than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over
the country. The modern usage of nations, which has become law,
would be violated; that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated, and
private rights annulled. The people change their allegiance; their
relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their . . .
rights of property, remain undisturbed . . . . Had Florida changed
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See supra notes 80–89 and accompanying text.
Foster, 27 U.S. at 313–14.
Id. at 313.
Lessee of Pollard v. Files, 43 U.S. 591, 603 (1844).
Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. 410, 436 (1838).
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its sovereign by an act containing no stipulation respecting the
property of individuals, the right of property in all those who
became subjects or citizens of the new government would have
been unaffected by the change; it would have remained the same
as under the ancient sovereign. . . . A cession of territory is never
understood to be a cession of the property belonging to its inhabitants. The king cedes that only which belonged to him; lands he
had previously granted, were not his to cede. Neither party could
so understand the cession; neither party could consider itself as
attempting a wrong to individuals, condemned by the practice of
the whole civilized world. The cession of a territory, by its name,
from one sovereign to another . . . would be necessarily understood to pass the sovereignty only, and not to interfere with private property.110

In Marshall’s view, private property rights “remain undisturbed” when one
sovereign conveys land to another. Marshall stated explicitly that these principles “ought to be kept in view, when we construe the eighth article of the
treaty.”111 He then proceeded to analyze the treaty text.112 Thus, in
Percheman, Marshall construed Article 8 of the Florida Treaty in conformity
with the principles of the law of nations.
Those principles applied to perfect titles differently than to inchoate titles. To appreciate this point, it is helpful to recall Justice Iredell’s distinction between executory and executed treaty provisions.113 Executory treaty
provisions require the nation to undertake affirmative steps to fulfill its
treaty commitments, whereas executed treaty provisions “require no further
act to be done.”114 The Court held in Percheman that Article 8 was executed,
as applied to Percheman’s land, because Percheman held title “in absolute
property.” No further act was necessary to grant him legal title because he
already held legal title before Spain ceded Florida to the United States. In
Marshall’s words, “that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged
and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged”115 if the treaty
deprived him of pre-existing property rights by requiring legislative action
to grant him property that he already owned.
Conversely, if an individual held an inchoate title to property before the
date of the treaty, the treaty did not magically convert that inchoate title
into a perfect legal title. Under the law of nations, the property rights of
individuals who held inchoate titles “remain[ed] undisturbed,”116 just as the
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 86–87 (1833).
Id. at 88.
Id. at 88–89.
See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 272 (1796) (Iredell, J.).
Percheman, 32 U.S. at 87.
Id.
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property rights of individuals who held perfect titles remained undisturbed.
An individual with an inchoate title had an equitable claim against the sovereign, entitling the individual to insist that the sovereign take affirmative
steps to convert that inchoate title into a perfect title.117 When sovereignty
transferred from Spain to the United States, “the fee [i.e., the legal title] was
transferred to the United States by the treaty, with the equity attached in
the claimant.”118 Accordingly, the equitable claim against Spain became an
equitable claim against the United States. Since affirmative steps were still
needed to convert the inchoate title into a perfect title, Article 8 was executory as it applied to inchoate titles.
Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, Percheman did not overrule Foster.
In both cases, Marshall construed Article 8 in accordance with the law of
nations principle that private property rights “remain undisturbed” when
one sovereign conveys territory to another. Article 8 was executed as it applied to Percheman because he already held a perfect title. However, in Marshall’s view, Article 8 was executory as it applied to the Foster plaintiffs
because they had an equitable claim against the sovereign that was “as obligatory on the United States, as on his catholic majesty.”119
3. Textual Analysis in Foster and Percheman
According to the conventional view, Marshall’s textual analysis of the
Florida Treaty led him to conclude in Foster that Article 8 was non-selfexecuting. In Percheman, though, Marshall’s analysis of the Spanish text led
him to conclude that Article 8 was self-executing.120 The conventional wisdom is wrong: Marshall’s textual analysis in both Foster and Percheman focused on the nineteenth century distinction between executory and executed
treaty provisions, not the twentieth century distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing provisions.121
Article 8 of the Florida Treaty specified that land grants made by Spanish
authorities prior to the date of the treaty “shall be ratified and confirmed to
the persons in possession of the lands.”122 In Foster, Marshall distinguished
this language from hypothetical language stating that land “grants are
hereby confirmed.”123 “Had such been its language,” said Marshall, “it
would have acted directly on the subject.”124 In other words, it would have
been executed, not executory, because no further act would be necessary to
implement a provision stating that grants “are hereby confirmed.” How117. See Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. 410, 436 (1838).
118. McDonogh v. Millaudon, 44 U.S. 693, 706 (1845).
119. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 313 (1829).
120. See, e.g., Restatement, supra note 5, § 111 n.5; Vázquez, supra note 3, at 632–45.
121. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining the distinction between the nineteenth
century concept of an executory treaty and the twentieth century concept of a non-self-executing treaty).
122. Florida Treaty, supra note 71, art. 8.
123. Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.
124. Id.
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ever, according to Marshall’s analysis in Foster, since Article 8 specified that
the land grants “shall be ratified and confirmed,” the treaty merely
“pledge[d] the faith of the United States to pass acts which shall ratify and
confirm” the grants.125 In other words, he concluded that Article 8 was
executory, not executed, because it obligated the United States to take affirmative steps to confirm the grants. Thus, Marshall’s textual analysis in
Foster focused on the distinction between executory and executed treaty provisions, not the modern distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaty provisions.
Careful analysis of Percheman confirms this view. In Percheman, Marshall
adopted the argument presented by Joseph White, the attorney who represented Percheman. Comparing the English and Spanish versions of Article 8,
White argued that “[t]he English side of the treaty leaves the ratification of
the grants executory—they shall be ratified; the Spanish, executed—they
shall continue acknowledged and confirmed.”126 Marshall’s analysis of the
Spanish and English versions of Article 8 was virtually identical to
White’s.127 Marshall contrasted the Spanish version—which (as newly retranslated) specified that grants “shall remain ratified and confirmed”—
with the original English version, which specified that grants “shall be ratified and confirmed.”128 He concluded that Article 8 was executed, not executory, as it applied to Percheman’s land, because the United States did not
need to take any affirmative steps to perfect Percheman’s already perfect
title.129 Although Marshall did not use the words “executed” and “executory,” later nineteenth century Supreme Court opinions confirm that Marshall’s analysis in Foster and Percheman relied on the distinction between
executory and executed treaty provisions.130
Of course, Marshall said in Foster not only that the United States was
obligated to take affirmative steps to implement Article 8 (i.e., it was executory), but also that legislative action was necessary (i.e., it was non-selfexecuting). The conventional wisdom holds that, under Marshall’s analysis
in Foster, “the need for implementing legislation has its source in the treaty
itself.”131 However, this view is mistaken for three reasons.
First, the claim that Article 8 requires legislative implementation, as a
matter of treaty interpretation, has no basis in the treaty text. The treaty
specifies that the grants “shall be ratified and confirmed.”132 But as Mar125. Id.
126. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 69 (1833).
127. Compare Percheman, 32 U.S. at 88–89 (Marshall’s opinion) with id. at 68–70 (White’s argument).
128. Id. at 88–89.
129. Id. at 86–89.
130. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 746 (1838) (stating that Foster
“recognised the distinction between an executory treaty . . . and an executed treaty”); see also Sloss, supra
note 3, at 19–23.
131. Vázquez, supra note 3, at 631.
132. Florida Treaty, supra note 71, art. 8.
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shall himself conceded, the text does not address the question “[b]y whom
shall they be ratified and confirmed?”133
Second, it was well established in the early nineteenth century, as it is
today, that international law does not govern the internal processes by which
a nation implements its treaty obligations.134 The question of who shall ratify and confirm the grants—Congress, the President, or the judiciary—is a
question about the internal process through which the United States implements its treaty obligations. As his speech in the Jonathan Robbins case
makes clear,135 Marshall understood that this is not a question of treaty interpretation; it is a question governed by domestic law.
Third, if the conventional interpretation were correct—and Percheman had
held as a matter of treaty interpretation that Article 8 was self-executing—
then Article 8 would be self-executing for all property interests, including
inchoate titles as well as perfect titles. However, after Percheman, the Supreme Court decided dozens of cases involving Article 8 of the Florida
Treaty and Article 3 of the Louisiana Treaty,136 and it repeatedly affirmed
that congressional legislation was necessary to perfect inchoate titles. Yet, no
legislation was necessary to implement U.S. treaty obligations regarding already-perfect titles.137 Therefore, treaty interpretation, without more, cannot
answer the question whether a particular treaty provision requires legislative
implementation, because the Court’s decisions in the Louisiana-Florida
property cases established that the same treaty provision required legislative
implementation in some cases but not others. Hence, it is necessary to look
beyond the text of the treaty to understand why some treaties require legislative implementation. As the next section contends, Marshall’s conclusion
in Foster that Article 8 required legislative implementation probably rested
on certain unstated assumptions about the constitutional distribution of
governmental power to regulate property.
4. The Need for Legislative Implementation
In Foster, Marshall stated clearly that legislation was necessary to implement Article 8 of the Florida Treaty.138 Unfortunately, he did not explain
why he thought legislation was necessary. The best explanation is that Marshall believed legislation was necessary because: 1) the plaintiffs held an
133. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 315 (1829).
134. See 1 Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law § 21
(9th ed. 1992); 2 Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States § 523 (1922) (stating that the process by which states effect performance
of treaty obligations “is primarily a matter of domestic concern”); id. § 524 n.4 (citing 18th and 19th
century authorities).
135. See supra notes 50–69 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 73.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Wiggins, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 334, 349–50 (1840); see also supra notes
73–89 and accompanying text.
138. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
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inchoate title; 2) the treaty obligated the United States to perfect that inchoate title, but only insofar as Spain had a pre-existing duty to perfect the
title; and 3) for domestic separation of powers reasons, federal legislation
was necessary to perfect inchoate titles.
Before addressing these points directly, it is helpful to recall two points
established above. First, in Ware v. Hylton, Justice Iredell stated that executory treaty obligations can be divided into three classes—legislative, executive, and judicial—depending on which branch of government has the
domestic constitutional authority to implement the treaty obligation.139
Second, in his speech in the Jonathan Robbins case, Marshall applied Iredell’s two-step approach to support his claim that the President had the
domestic constitutional authority to execute Article 27 of the Jay Treaty.140
Thus, it should come as no surprise that Marshall applied the same two-step
approach to analyze the issues in Foster. Under Iredell’s framework, the question whether a treaty is executed or executory involves treaty interpretation
(step one), but the question whether an executory treaty requires legislative,
executive, or judicial implementation involves a constitutional separation of
powers analysis (step two).
Under Marshall’s analysis in Foster, Article 8 merely granted the plaintiffs
an equitable title.141 Marshall wrote that this equitable title was “as obligatory on the United States, as on his catholic majesty.”142 In other words, the
United States had a treaty obligation to perfect the plaintiffs’ inchoate title
“to the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories had
remained under the dominion of his catholic majesty.” Marshall’s opinion
makes clear that he thought this was an executory treaty obligation.143 Thus,
step one of the two-step analysis is fairly clear. Unfortunately, though, step
two of the analysis—the constitutional separation of powers analysis—is underdeveloped in Foster. In essence, Marshall stated his conclusion that legislative implementation was necessary (rather than judicial or executive
implementation), but he did not provide the separation of powers analysis
needed to support that conclusion.
Even so, other materials discussed above help illuminate Marshall’s unstated separation of powers rationale. Marshall’s speech in the Jonathan Robbins case demonstrates that he believed all government actors have a
constitutional duty to implement U.S. treaty obligations, insofar as they can
do so by acting within the scope of their domestic legal authority. Therefore,
Marshall’s conclusion in Foster that Article 8 required legislative implementation necessarily implies that he thought the President and the judiciary
lacked the domestic legal authority to convert the plaintiff’s inchoate title
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See Ware, 3 U.S. 199, 271–73 (1796); see supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
Foster, 27 U.S. at 313.
See supra notes 120–30 and accompanying text.
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into a perfect legal title. This conclusion is consistent with later cases in
which the Supreme Court held explicitly that Congress was the only institution with the domestic constitutional authority to convert inchoate titles
into perfect titles.144
The Court never explained why Congress had exclusive constitutional authority to convert inchoate titles into perfect titles. However, Article IV of
the Constitution provides textual support for this view. It states: “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice
any Claims of the United States.”145 Consider the situation of individuals
who held equitable claims to land in Louisiana or Florida before the United
States acquired sovereignty over those territories. When the relevant treaty
conveyed sovereignty over the land, “the fee [i.e., the legal title] was transferred to the United States by the treaty, with the equity attached in the
claimant.”146 Hence, upon entry into force of the treaty, the land became
subject to Congress’ Article IV power to regulate “[p]roperty belonging to
the United States.”147
The majority of cases arising under Article 3 of the Louisiana Treaty and
Article 8 of the Florida Treaty pitted private claimants against the United
States.148 If the executive or judicial branches awarded legal titles to private
claimants on the basis of the treaties themselves, without awaiting congressional guidance, the United States would have lost its legal title to the property. However, Article IV specified that “nothing in this Constitution shall
be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States,”149 implying that the executive and judicial branches must exercise their powers
under Articles II and III so as not to interfere with Congress’s Article IV
Property Power. Therefore, if the executive or judicial branch attempted to
convert equitable titles into legal titles without awaiting congressional action, they would have prejudiced claims of the United States in contravention of Article IV. This may explain why the Court consistently held that
federal legislation was constitutionally required to implement Article 8 of
the Florida Treaty and Article 3 of the Louisiana Treaty, as those articles
applied to inchoate titles.
In sum, although Marshall’s opinion in Foster is hardly a model of clarity,
Marshall apparently believed that legislation was necessary to implement
Article 8 because: the plaintiffs held an inchoate title; the treaty obligated
144. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
145. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
146. McDonogh v. Millaudon, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 693, 706 (1845).
147. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. In contrast, if a person held a perfected title before the treaty
entered into force, the land never became subject to Congress’s Article IV power because the treaty did
not disturb perfect titles.
148. See supra note 73 (listing 75 property cases, 45 of which involved the United States as a party).
149. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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the United States to perfect that inchoate title to the same extent that Spain
was obligated to do so; and federal legislation was necessary to perfect the
plaintiffs’ inchoate title because Article IV granted Congress the exclusive
power to dispose of territory belonging to the United States. Thus, in terms
of the four categories of non-self-executing treaties identified by Professor
Vázquez, Article 8, in Marshall’s view, belonged to the class “of treaties that
purport to accomplish something for which the Constitution requires a statute.”150 In other words, Marshall’s analysis in Foster is not an example of
what Professor Vázquez, and others have called “Foster non-selfexecution.”151
C. The Advantages of the Two-Step Approach
Modern judicial decisions routinely cite Foster as authority for the proposition that judicial application of the intent-based approach to self-execution
is doctrinally required.152 The preceding analysis demonstrates that Foster
provides no support for the intent-based doctrine. During the 180-year period between its 1829 decision in Foster and its 2008 decision in Medellin,
the Court applied treaties in hundreds of cases without stopping to ask
whether the particular treaty provision at issue was self-executing.153 During
the same period, the Court did not decide a single case in which it denied
relief solely on the ground that a treaty was non-self-executing.154 Thus,
insofar as courts look to history as a guide, the history (before Medellin)
favors the two-step approach over the intent-based doctrine.
Even so, one must still ask whether courts should adopt the two-step
approach today. Iredell’s distinction between executory and executed treaty
provisions is not especially helpful for analyzing modern treaties because the
vast majority of modern treaty provisions are executory, not executed. Accordingly, this Article advocates an updated version of the two-step approach. In step one, courts should apply a treaty interpretation analysis to
ascertain the nature and scope of the international obligation (the “international obligation” issue). In step two, courts should apply domestic law—
informed by the treaty interpretation analysis in step one—to determine
which government actors within the United States have the power and/or
duty to implement the treaty domestically (the “domestic implementation”
issue).155
150. Vázquez, supra note 3, at 630.
151. Id. at 629–31.
152. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008).
153. See Hollis, supra note 17; Van Alstine, supra note 17; Paul B. Stephan, Treaties in the Supreme
Court, 1946-2000, in Continuity and Change, supra note 17.
154. See Vázquez, supra note 3, at 601.
155. If a treaty does not obligate the United States to undertake domestic implementation measures,
step two becomes unnecessary. Treaties that do not require domestic implementation measures include:
“executed” treaty provisions (where treaty performance is accomplished by ratification); and “precatory”
treaty provisions (i.e., those that do not impose any binding obligation on the United States).
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The primary advantage of the two-step approach is analytic clarity. The
intent-based approach is analytically incoherent.156 Courts applying the intent-based doctrine consistently conflate the international obligation inquiry
with the domestic implementation inquiry by combining them into a single
inquiry, asking whether the treaty makers intended the treaty to be selfexecuting.157 The question itself is nonsensical because, in the vast majority
of cases, the treaty makers did not have any specific intention concerning
which government actors within the United States have the power and/or
duty to implement the treaty domestically. Unable to find any actual evidence of the treaty makers’ intentions, the courts invent a fictitious intent to
resolve domestic implementation issues.158 In contrast, the two-step approach promotes analytic clarity by drawing a sharp distinction between the
international obligation issue and the domestic implementation issue. If
courts applied the two-step approach, they would consider a variety of domestic constitutional and statutory provisions to resolve domestic implementation issues. Since those domestic constitutional and statutory
provisions actually address domestic implementation issues, courts applying
the two-step approach could answer domestic legal questions by applying
real laws, rather than invoking a fictitious “intent of the treaty makers.”
Analytic clarity also yields certain additional benefits—most importantly,
transparency and accountability. Judicial decisions applying the intentbased approach are notoriously lacking in transparency. Medellin illustrates
this point. The Medellin Court clearly held that Article 94 of the United
Nations Charter is not self-executing,159 but commentators disagree about
why or how the Court reached this conclusion.160 Indeed, commentators do
not even agree about what the Court meant when it said that Article 94 was
not self-executing.161 Adoption of the two-step approach would force courts
to distinguish clearly between international obligation issues and domestic
implementation issues, yielding greater transparency in judicial
decisionmaking.

156. Some commentators suggest that the treaty makers can provide clarity under the intent-based
approach by adopting declarations specifying that a particular treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing. See infra note 190. However, such declarations do not actually provide much clarity regarding domestic implementation issues because the terms “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” are deeply
ambiguous. See supra note 42; see also infra notes 190–92 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504–14.
158. See, e.g., id.
159. Id.
160. Compare Vázquez, supra note 3, at 660–65 (construing Medellin as a decision about the nature of
the international obligation embodied in the U.N. Charter) with Bradley, supra note 2, at 168–76 (construing Medellin as a decision about domestic implementation of the U.N. Charter).
161. See, e.g., ABA/ASIL Joint Task Force on Treaties in U.S. Law, Report (March 2009), available at
http://www.asil.org/files/TreatiesTaskForceReport.pdf (analyzing various possible interpretations of the
Supreme Court decision in Medellin); John T. Parry, Rewriting the Roberts Court’s Law of Treaties, 88 Tex L.
Rev. 65, 67–68 (2010) (“with Medellin, defenders of the opinion are doing as much rewriting and
contextualizing as its opponents”).
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Application of the two-step approach would also enhance accountability
for decisions that trigger violations of the nation’s treaty obligations. Under
the two-step approach, state government officials may not take steps that
trigger a breach of U.S. treaty obligations without explicit authorization
from the federal political branches.162 Thus, the federal political branches are
accountable for decisions to violate treaties. In contrast, under the intentbased approach, state governments can trigger a breach of U.S. treaty obligations without any authorization from the federal political branches. Again,
Medellin illustrates the point. The Supreme Court decision in Medellin effectively authorized Texas to implement the death penalty, and Texas proceeded to execute Medellı́n. 163 The matter is not free from doubt, but most
commentators agree that his execution constituted a breach of U.S. treaty
obligations.164 Congress never authorized that breach, and the President expressly opposed state action that would trigger a violation of U.S. treaty
obligations. Under the Supreme Court’s intent-based analysis, though, the
question whether the nation breached its treaty obligations was simply irrelevant. Texas was free to execute Medellı́n, regardless of the international
consequences, unless Congress enacted legislation to block action inconsistent with U.S. treaty obligations.165 Thus, the Supreme Court and the Texas
Governor made decisions that probably triggered a violation of the nation’s
treaty commitments, but no government official at the state or federal level
ever assumed responsibility for the decision to violate the U.N. Charter.
II. The Constitution and Treaty Implementation
Part I demonstrated that the two-step approach to self-execution is superior to the intent-based approach. Parts II and III address application of the
two-step approach in cases, like Medellin, where a treaty constrains the authority of state governments. Medellin is complicated because the key obligation was not based directly on a treaty: it was based on the decision of an
international tribunal whose authority derived from a treaty. These types of
162. See infra notes 171–93 and accompanying text.
163. See John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 102 Am.
J. Int’l L. 860, 862 (2008).
164. The State of Texas argued that it implemented the U.S. treaty obligation by providing the
judicial hearing mandated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). See Br. in Opp’n, Medellin v.
Texas, No. 08-5573, at 4, available at http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/10x08_04_08%20
BIO.pdf. However, the Supreme Court did not rely on this argument, and commentators who defend the
Court’s opinion in Medellin have placed little or no weight on this argument. If, as seems likely, the
judicial hearing that Texas courts provided for Medellı́n did not satisfy the requirements established by
the ICJ, then his execution placed the United States in violation of its international obligations.
165. Senator Leahy has introduced draft legislation designed to avoid further violations of U.S. treaty
obligations under the U.N. Charter. See S.1194, 112th Cong., (2011). Meanwhile, despite efforts by
President Obama and former President Bush to halt a pending execution, Texas has triggered an additional treaty violation by executing another Mexican national. See Chris McGreal, “Humberto Leal Garcia
Executed in Texas Despite White House Appeal,” The Guardian, July 8, 2011, at 28.
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international delegations raise distinct issues.166 Accordingly, Part II focuses
on domestic application of treaties in cases that do not involve international
delegations. Part III considers how the element of international delegation
alters the analysis.
Part II is divided into two sections. Section II.A asks: when does a treaty
create non-discretionary duties for state government officers under domestic
law?167 Section II.B addresses judicial enforcement of treaties against state
officers. The order of the two sections is important. If a treaty does not impose
a non-discretionary duty on a government officer, questions about judicial
enforcement are largely irrelevant. If a treaty does impose a non-discretionary
duty on a government officer, certain remedial consequences follow. As
Henry Hart observed, “[t]he remedial parts of law . . . are subsidiary. To the
primary parts they have the relation of means to ends. They come second not
first.”168 Whether a treaty imposes non-discretionary duties on state officers
is a question of primary law; issues involving judicial enforcement implicate
remedial law. Many courts and commentators, when addressing self-execution, put “the cart before the horse”169 by jumping straight to questions
about judicial enforcement, skipping the analytically prior question of
whether the treaty creates non-discretionary duties for domestic government
officials.170 To dispel the confusion surrounding self-execution doctrine, it is
essential to disentangle primary law from remedial law, and to address questions about primary duties before analyzing judicial enforcement.
A. The Supremacy Clause and Non-Discretionary Duties
This section contends that a treaty is presumptively binding on state government officers171 if: (1) the treaty imposes non-discretionary duties on the
United States under international law; (2) state officers have the capacity to
promote or hinder treaty performance; and (3) application of treaty duties to
state officers would not violate the anti-commandeering rule.172 This claim
is based primarily on the text of the Supremacy Clause. Section III.A.1 ex166. See McGinnis, supra note 24; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, Law & Contemp. Probs. 22 (Winter 2008).
167. Throughout this Article, the term “state government officer” refers collectively to state and local
government officers.
168. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 929, 935 (1951).
169. In a famous speech in 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes declared that it puts “the cart before the
horse . . . to consider the right or the duty as something existing apart from and independent of the
consequences of its breach.” Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 458 (1897).
In an equally famous critique of Holmes, Henry Hart stated: “Holmes’ ‘cart’ is the horse and his ‘horse’
is the cart.” Hart, supra note 168, at 935.
170. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2, at 140–48 (analyzing judicial enforcement of treaties without
addressing which treaties create primary duties); Young, supra note 2, at 107–28 (same).
171. Throughout this Article, the statement that a treaty is binding on government officers means
that it creates non-discretionary duties for government officers as a matter of domestic law.
172. The “anti-commandeering” rule precludes Congress from enacting legislation that “commandeers” state legislatures or state executive officers. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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plains and defends this claim. Section III.A.2 considers whether and how the
treaty makers can overcome the presumption that a treaty binds state
officers.
1. The Ordinary Operation of the Supremacy Clause
Whether a treaty imposes non-discretionary duties on the United States is
a treaty interpretation question. A treaty that does not impose binding obligations on the nation cannot impose binding obligations on government
officers under domestic law. Suppose, though, that a treaty creates non-discretionary duties for the United States under international law. Does the
Supremacy Clause mean that the treaty is automatically binding on state
government officers under domestic law? The Clause specifies that “all Treaties” are “the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”173 Read literally, the text seems to say that all
treaties are directly binding on state governments. This interpretation is
broadly consistent with the original understanding of the Supremacy Clause.
Although commentators disagree about the original understanding, they
generally agree that the Framers included treaties in the Supremacy Clause
to make treaties binding on state government officers under domestic law.174
There are two problems, though, with a literal interpretation of the
Supremacy Clause. First, the Constitution prohibits federal lawmakers from
“commandeering” state legislatures or state executive officers.175 It is unclear whether the anti-commandeering rule applies to treaty lawmaking, as
opposed to other methods of federal lawmaking,176 but this Article assumes
that the anti-commandeering rule applies to treaties. The main question
under consideration is: when does a treaty imposing non-discretionary duties
on the nation create non-discretionary duties for state government officers
under domestic law? State legislatures are not “government officers,” so we
can set aside issues involving commandeering of state legislatures. Moreover,
the anti-commandeering rule does not apply to state courts.177 That leaves
173. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
174. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, The Constitution’s Text in Foreign Affairs (2007); Flaherty, supra note 3; Yoo, supra note 2, at 1978–80; see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796). Professor
Bradley contends that the Supremacy Clause does not constrain the federal political branches, but he
agrees that the Clause makes treaties binding on the states. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 140–48.
175. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149–51 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. at 905–33;
New York, 505 U.S. at 161–69 (1992).
176. Compare Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to be a Nation?: Federal Power vs. “States’ Rights” in Foreign
Affairs, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1277, 1279 (1999) (contending that the anti-commandeering rule does not
apply to the treaty power) with Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103
Colum. L. Rev. 403, 480 (2003) (contending that treaty power is subject to anti-commandeering limitations) and Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1317
(1999) (same).
177. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 907 (the Constitution “permit[s] imposition of an obligation on state
judges to enforce federal prescriptions”) (emphasis in original); see also U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (specifying that “the Judges in every State shall be bound” by treaties).
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state executive officers. Broadly speaking, one can divide treaty-based duties
into prohibitions and affirmative mandates. The anti-commandeering rule
applies only to affirmative mandates, not prohibitions.178 Thus, construing
the Supremacy Clause in light of the anti-commandeering rule, the anticommandeering rule narrows the literal interpretation of the Clause by precluding application of affirmative mandates to state executive officers in
some cases.179 However, the rule does not affect application of affirmative
mandates to state judicial officers, nor does it affect application of treatybased prohibitions.
The other problem with a literal interpretation of the Supremacy Clause
is that state officers lack the capacity to perform some treaty obligations. For
example, federal legislation is necessary to implement a treaty obligating the
United States to appropriate funds for an international organization:180 state
officers lack the domestic legal authority to appropriate federal funds. Nor
do state officers have the domestic legal authority to implement a treaty
obligating the United States to negotiate with other countries because international negotiation is a federal executive function.181 It makes no sense to
construe the Supremacy Clause to obligate state officers to perform functions
that the Constitution assigns exclusively to Congress or the President.
However, other treaties involve matters within the scope of state government authority. Examples include the treaty prohibition on torture182 and
the treaty mandate to notify detained foreign nationals that they have a
right to consult consular officers.183 In cases where a treaty imposes nondiscretionary duties on the nation, and state officers have the capacity to
promote or hinder treaty performance,184 the Supremacy Clause transforms
the international duty into a domestic legal duty, making it directly binding on state government officers, at least presumptively.185 The fact that a
178. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 913 (noting “the duty owed to the National Government, on the part of
all state officials . . . not to obstruct the operation of federal law”) (emphasis in original).
179. The precise scope of the prohibition on commandeering state executive officers remains unclear.
For present purposes, though, it is sufficient to note that some treaties do create affirmative mandates for
state executive officers, and at least some such treaties do not appear to raise commandeering problems.
180. See Restatement, supra note 5, § 111 cmt. i.
181. See id., § 311 cmt. b; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(stating that the President “makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone
negotiates”).
182. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
183. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, art. 36, Apr. 24,
1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR].
184. Here again, the two-step approach brings added clarity to the analysis. Treaty interpretation
determines the nature and content of the international obligation. Domestic law determines whether a
state officer has the authority to perform that obligation.
185. This Article does not express a view about how the Clause applies to treaties that do not impose
binding obligations on the nation, or how (or whether) the Clause applies to federal officers. Most commentators agree that the Take Care Clause creates a legal duty for the President to implement treaties,
insofar as he has the domestic legal authority to do so, unless Congress or the treaty makers have assigned
responsibility for treaty implementation to some person or institution outside the Executive Branch. See,
e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 331 (2008).
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strictly literal interpretation of the Supremacy Clause is potentially problematic does not permit courts and commentators to ignore the text altogether. An interpretation that makes the Clause superfluous is
impermissible.186 Therefore, under the bare minimalist interpretation of the
Supremacy Clause—consistent with the principle that the Clause must have
some effect—a treaty imposing non-discretionary duties on the nation presumptively creates non-discretionary domestic legal duties for state government officers who have the capacity to promote or hinder treaty
performance, subject to the anti-commandeering rule.
2. Overcoming the Presumption
The preceding interpretation of the Supremacy Clause is not controversial. The main controversy involves two issues. First, what must the treaty
makers do to overcome the presumption that treaties are binding on state
officers in the circumstances described above? Second, in what circumstances
are treaty-based duties judicially enforceable against state officers? The remainder of this section addresses the first question. Part II.B addresses the
second question. Before proceeding, though, it is important to emphasize
that this Article does not advocate a presumption in favor of judicial enforcement of treaties. Much ink has been spilled debating the merits of such
a presumption.187 In my view, the debate focuses on the wrong question.
The Supremacy Clause establishes a presumption that treaties create domestic legal duties for state officers in the circumstances described above. Judicial enforcement is a distinct issue that requires separate analysis.
One could plausibly interpret the Supremacy Clause as a hard rule, rather
than a presumption. Under this view, Article II does not grant the treaty
makers the power to alter the ordinary operation of the Clause for particular
treaties.188 This Article assumes that the Supremacy Clause merely creates a
presumption, not a hard rule.189 The issue is: What must treaty makers do
186. See Norman J. Singer, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46: 6 230–31 (7th
ed. 2007) (“It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word,
clause and sentence of a statute. A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions,
so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This fundamental principle of statutory construction applies with equal force to constitutional text.
187. See, e.g., Vázquez, supra note 3; Bradley, supra note 2; Young, supra note 2.
188. This Article uses the term “treaty makers” to refer to the President and Senate, acting jointly
under Article II.
189. The assumption that the Supremacy Clause merely creates a presumption, rather than a hard
rule, is justified for at least two reasons. First, from a functional standpoint, construing the Supremacy
Clause as a hard rule would deprive the treaty makers of flexibility necessary to handle international
delegations. See infra notes 249–56 and accompanying text. Second, consider the analogy to the Take
Care Clause. Commentators generally agree that the President has a duty under the Take Care Clause to
implement treaties, but that treaty makers can assign responsibility for implementation of particular
treaty functions to officials outside the Executive Branch. See Swaine, supra note 185. If the treaty makers
can assign treaty implementation functions to actors outside the Executive Branch, there is no apparent
reason why they cannot also assign treaty implementation functions to actors other than state government officers.
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or say to overcome that presumption? There are two aspects to this question:
one concerning the content of statements intended to alter the ordinary operation of the Supremacy Clause, the other involving the form of those
statements.
First, with respect to content, several commentators assume that a declaration specifying that a treaty is “not self-executing” is sufficiently clear to
alter the ordinary operation of the Supremacy Clause.190 This claim is problematic because commentators advancing the claim generally fail to distinguish between primary and remedial law concepts of self-execution. Insofar
as they equate “not self-executing” with “not judicially enforceable,”191
their argument does not address the primary legal issue: whether a treaty
creates domestic legal duties for state government officers. Since the statement that a treaty is “not self-executing” is ambiguous on this point, such a
statement is not sufficiently clear to alter the ordinary operation of the
Supremacy Clause. Similarly, a statement that a treaty “is not judicially
enforceable in the absence of implementing legislation” lacks sufficient clarity because it does not specify whether the treaty is binding on state officers.
If treaty makers want to authorize state government officers to engage in
conduct inconsistent with the nation’s treaty obligations, they should make
a statement along the following lines: “this treaty shall not create domestic
legal duties for state government officers unless Congress enacts legislation
specifying that the treaty is binding on state officers.”192
Proponents of non-self-execution may object that this approach creates an
unreasonably high barrier for the treaty makers to render a treaty non-selfexecuting. This objection is unpersuasive. Insofar as proponents of non-selfexecution favor limits on judicial enforcement of treaties, their objection is
misplaced because the proposed clear statement requirement does not address judicial enforcement. Moreover, the proposed clear statement requirement is consistent with the stated intent of treaty makers. When the treaty
makers have adopted non-self-executing declarations, they have clearly expressed their view that such declarations do not affect the duty of state officers under the Supremacy Clause to conform their conduct to the nation’s
treaty obligations.193
190. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2, at 149–57; Vázquez, supra note 3, at 672–85; Young, supra note
2, at 121–25.
191. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2, at 134–40; Young, supra note 2, at 107–13.
192. The suggested language is effectively an anti-preemption provision. See Sloss, supra note 20, at
983–86 (discussing treaties and anti-preemption clauses).
193. The United States ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on Racial
Discrimination, and the Torture Convention subject to declarations that all three treaties are not selfexecuting. Even so, in testimony to the Senate, Executive Branch officials made clear that these treaties
are binding on state government officers under the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Hearing Before the Comm. On Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate, 103rd Cong. 20 (1994) (stating “that a duly ratified treaty will supercede [sic] prior inconsistent
federal law”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Hearing Before the Comm. On Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 102nd Cong. 80 (1992) (“Under the Supremacy Clause, ratified treaties are the law of
the land, equivalent to federal statutes. . . . Consequently, properly ratified treaties can and do supersede
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Assuming the treaty makers adopt a statement along the lines suggested
above, what form should such a statement take? Several points are clear.
First, if the statement is included in the text of the treaty, it would have the
desired effect.194 Second, if the United States adopts a valid reservation limiting the scope of the international obligation, that reservation also limits
the scope of any derivative domestic legal duty.195 Third, if Congress enacts
legislation authorizing state governments to act in a manner contrary to
treaty-based duties, the legislation eliminates any domestic legal duty for
state officers to comply with the treaty.196 Fourth, if a state legislature enacts
legislation that purports to authorize treaty violations by state officers, that
legislation would be invalid under the express terms of the Supremacy
Clause.
Suppose, though, that the treaty makers adopt a statement, in the context
of ratification, stipulating that a particular treaty provision shall not be
binding on state government officers unless Congress enacts legislation to
make it binding. Does the form of that statement matter? The short answer
is that the statement must, at a minimum, be included in the Senate resolution of ratification—the official document by means of which the Senate
consents to ratification of the treaty.197 The Supremacy Clause is law. Therefore, to alter the ordinary operation of the Clause, the treaty makers must
express their will in the form of a law.198 Neither a statement transmitted
from the President to Congress, nor a statement in a Senate committee report, nor a statement by an individual Senator on the Senate floor is a “law.”
These types of statements may help shed light on treaty interpretation is-

inconsistent domestic law.”); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Hearing Before the Comm. On Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 101st Cong. 42 (1990) (stating that,
after ratification, the Torture Convention “would be part of domestic law. If you adopt this treaty, it is
not just international law. The standard becomes part of our law.”); see also David Sloss, The Domestication
of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 Yale J. Int’l
L. 129, 152–97 (1999) (providing a detailed review of a Senate record associated with ratification of
human rights treaties); Young, supra note 2, at 134–36 (contending that non-self-executing treaties are
binding on state governments).
194. This conclusion follows from the assumption that treaty makers have the power to alter the
ordinary operation of the Supremacy Clause. The least controversial way for the treaty makers to exercise
domestic lawmaking authority is to include language in the treaty that the United States ratifies. If the
treaty makers have the power to alter the ordinary operation of the Supremacy Clause, they must be able
to do so by inserting appropriate language in the treaty.
195. See Restatement, supra note 5, § 314 cmt. b.
196. This point is implicit in the later-in-time rule. See id., § 115 cmt. a.
197. The argument here focuses on Article II treaties. If the international agreement takes the form of
a congressional-executive agreement, the relevant statement would have to be included in the statute
approving that agreement. If the agreement takes the form of a sole executive agreement, the statement
would have to be included in the text of the international agreement itself, since there is no document
expressing legislative consent for a sole executive agreement.
198. Professor Vázquez makes a similar argument. See Vázquez, supra note 3, at 681–85.

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\53-1\HLI103.txt

unknown

Seq: 37

2012 / Executing Foster v. Neilson

13-FEB-12

13:33

171

sues, but the question whether a particular treaty provision is binding on
state officers is a domestic law issue, not a treaty interpretation issue.199
Some may object that a statement included in the Senate resolution of
ratification is not “law” either, unless that statement is formally transmitted
to the other treaty parties. Conditions transmitted to other parties are “law”
because they become part of the treaty.200 In contrast, statements in the
Senate resolution of ratification that are not transmitted to other parties are
not part of the treaty. Assuming this is true, the fact remains that the President may not ratify a treaty without first obtaining Senate consent.201 Therefore, the President may not use the Article II treaty power to create domestic
law without Senate consent. If the Senate consents subject to certain conditions—e.g., the treaty is not binding on state officers without implementing
legislation—and those conditions are included in the formal instrument in
which the Senate grants consent, those conditions must be controlling for
purposes of domestic law.202 Otherwise, the President could circumvent the
constitutional safeguards that restrict his power to use Article II treaties to
create domestic law.203
B. Judicial Enforcement and the Due Process Clause
Many commentators equate the concept of self-execution with judicial
enforcement and therefore agree that a self-executing treaty is judicially enforceable while a non-self-executing one is not.204 This approach is problematic because the conclusion that a particular law is not enforceable by a
particular litigant in a particular type of judicial proceeding does not tell us
whether that same law is enforceable by a different litigant in a different
type of proceeding.205 Granted, laws that do not create non-discretionary
duties for natural or legal persons may not be enforceable by any litigant in
199. See supra notes 171–86 and accompanying text. Of course, if the treaty text explicitly addresses
the question of whether the treaty is binding on state officers, it would be a treaty interpretation issue. In
that case, though, any statement in the Senate record would be redundant.
200. Some scholars contend that a condition transmitted to treaty parties is not part of the treaty
unless it modifies the United States’ international legal obligations under the treaty. See, e.g., Stefan A.
Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, Foreword: Symposium on Parliamentary Participation in the Making and
Operation of Treaties, 67 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 293, 296–97 (1991). In their view, a purely domestic condition attached to a treaty is not “law” because it is not part of the treaty. Id. For a response to this
argument, see Vázquez, supra note 3, at 681–85.
201. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President power to make treaties “by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate”).
202. See Restatement, supra note 5, § 303 cmt. d; § 314 cmts. b and d.
203. One could argue that as a practical matter, restrictions on the President’s domestic lawmaking
power are illusory because the President has virtually unlimited discretion to bypass the Senate by using
sole executive agreements to create international law that has the status of supreme federal law. However,
this view arguably overstates the President’s ability to bypass the Senate because the President’s power to
enter into sole executive agreements is subject to constitutional constraints that are enforced politically,
if not judicially. See generally David Sloss, International Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
55 Stan. L. Rev. 1963, 1965–75 (2003).
204. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2; Stephan, supra note 2; Young, supra note 2.
205. This Article assumes that a non-self-executing treaty is a “law.” See supra note 19.
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any type of judicial proceeding. However, apart from non-self-executing
treaties, there is no such thing as a “law” that imposes non-discretionary
duties on government officers that is not enforceable by any litigant in any
type of judicial proceeding.206 Thus, if the doctrine of non-self-executing
treaties is construed to bar all avenues for private judicial enforcement of a
treaty that imposes non-discretionary duties on state government officers,
that doctrine is truly a constitutional anomaly.207 Indeed, when construed in
this fashion, the doctrine conflicts with the Due Process Clause.
It is well established that “a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise of the Due
Process Clause.”208 Writing for the Court in 1876, Justice Field expressed
the principle as follows:
Wherever one is assailed in his person or his property, there he
may defend, for the liability and the right are inseparable. This is
a principle of natural justice, recognized as such by the common
intelligence and conscience of all nations. A sentence of a court
pronounced against a party without hearing him, or giving him
an opportunity to be heard, is not a judicial determination of his
rights, and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.209
Writing for a unanimous Court in 1897, Justice White traced the evolution
of this principle from Roman law and the Magna Carta through Blackstone
and Coke.210 He also cited Story’s treatise on the Constitution, several nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions, and numerous English court
decisions.211
Although the opportunity to be heard is a constitutionally protected
right, that right applies differently to plaintiffs than to defendants. The distinction between plaintiffs and defendants is fundamental because plaintiffs
have the option of resolving their disputes through “private structuring of
individual relationships,” but defendants are “forced to settle their claims of

206. International free trade agreements are usually codified in the form of federal statutes. Those
statutes typically include provisions that purport to bar all avenues for private judicial enforcement of the
underlying international agreement. See Sloss, supra note 20, at 972. I have argued elsewhere that such
statutory provisions are constitutionally problematic. See id. at 977–94. Regardless, it is no accident that
the leading example of a statute that purports to bar any form of private judicial enforcement involves a
statute enacted to implement a treaty.
207. Professor Young contends that the Supreme Court decision in Medellin represents the “normalization” of treaty law: i.e., a decision to view treaties as being the same as, or similar to, other types of
federal law. He argues that normalization is a good thing. See Young, supra note 2, at 136–40. I generally
agree with Professor Young’s policy arguments supporting normalization. However, as a descriptive
matter, it would be more accurate to say that non-self-execution doctrine represents the “abnormalization” of treaty law.
208. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
209. Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876).
210. See Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 415–16 (1897).
211. Id. at 414–44.
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right and duty through the judicial process.”212 Congress undoubtedly has
the power to preclude private plaintiffs from initiating civil suits to enforce
federal laws—even laws that create non-discretionary duties for government
officers—by creating an administrative mechanism that provides an adequate substitute for judicial enforcement.213 By analogy, it is reasonable to
assume that the treaty makers have the power to preclude private plaintiffs
from initiating civil suits to enforce federal treaties, and they can exercise
this power by adopting a non-self-executing declaration.214
Criminal defendants are different from civil plaintiffs. Unlike civil plaintiffs, criminal defendants do not seek to initiate judicial proceedings; they
want to defend themselves against criminal charges brought by the government. The Due Process Clause does not permit the government to use the
judicial process to pursue criminal sanctions and, at the same time, prevent
the defendant from using that judicial process to present a defense. “Wherever one is assailed in his person or his property, there he may defend, for
the liability and the right are inseparable.”215 Thus, in certain cases, courts
have a constitutional duty to rule on the merits of a criminal defense. As the
Supreme Court stated more than one hundred years ago, “[t]here is no distinction in principle between determining a cause . . . in the actual absence
of the party, and rendering a decree by refusing to . . . consider the merits of
a sufficient defense.”216 Both procedures deny the defendant the opportunity
to be heard, and hence violate the Due Process Clause. Moreover, in Hovey v.
Elliott the Supreme Court held that the trial court violated the defendant’s
due process rights by refusing to decide the merits of a common law fraud
defense.217 Given that defendants have a constitutional right, rooted in the
Due Process Clause, to demand a judicial ruling on the merits of a common
law fraud defense, it necessarily follows that defendants have a comparable
constitutional right to demand a judicial ruling on the merits of a treatybased defense.218
In the context of criminal proceedings, there is an important distinction
between a defendant who seeks a remedy for a past violation and one who
seeks to prevent the future imposition of allegedly unlawful criminal sanctions. Defendants who raise Fourth Amendment defenses typically seek a
remedy for a past violation: they argue, for example, that the police obtained

212. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375, 377.
213. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
214. See Sloss, supra note 3, at 39–41. It is an interesting question whether, if the treaty makers adopt
this approach, the Due Process Clause requires them to provide an alternative enforcement mechanism
that provides an adequate substitute for judicial enforcement. This Article expresses no view on that
question.
215. Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876).
216. Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 446 (1897).
217. Id. at 444.
218. See Sloss, supra note 20, at 988–92; see also Carlos M. Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, the
Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 73, 84–87 (2007).
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evidence by conducting an illegal search.219 An appellate court might duck
the merits of such an argument by holding that, even if the search was
illegal, reversal is not warranted because the trial court’s decision to admit
the evidence constituted harmless error.220 In contrast, an individual raising
a defense based on the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause seeks to prevent the future imposition of an unlawful criminal
sanction. Unlike the Fourth Amendment, there is no harmless error exception to the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments.
Courts invariably decide such claims on the merits because it would be unconscionable to permit the State to impose criminal sanctions in violation of
that Clause. Doctrines of waiver or procedural default may bar Eighth
Amendment defenses that prisoners fail to raise at the first available opportunity, but those doctrines are consistent with the Due Process Clause precisely because they apply only in cases where an individual has had an
opportunity to be heard.221
In sum, when the state threatens to impose criminal sanctions on someone, and that person alleges that the threatened sanction is unlawful, the
Due Process Clause requires a judicial hearing on the merits of the argument, provided the argument is raised at the first available opportunity in
accordance with established procedural rules. This principle applies with
equal force to criminal defendants in state court and habeas petitioners in
state court. Whenever the state threatens an individual with criminal sanctions, the state must provide that person an opportunity to be heard (i.e., an
opportunity to present a defense). Virtually every state has rules permitting
convicted prisoners to bring claims—via habeas corpus or some analogous
proceeding—that they could not have raised at trial or on direct appeal. If a
convicted prisoner uses such a procedure to present an argument that the
state is threatening to impose an unlawful sanction, and he raises that argument at the first available opportunity in accordance with state procedural
rules, the Due Process Clause requires the court to address the merits of that
argument.222 The contrary view—that the Due Process Clause permits the
state to subject an individual to criminal sanctions without giving him any
opportunity to contest the legality of those sanctions—is antithetical to the
core meaning of “due process.”

219. See U.S. Const. amend. IV (prohibiting “unreasonable searches”).
220. See Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 27.6
(4th ed. 2004).
221. Similarly, federal law restricts federal habeas review of state criminal convictions if the individual had an opportunity to litigate his claim in state court. See Larry W. Yackle, Federal Courts
430–37 (1st ed. 1999). Indeed, the primary rationale for a restrictive approach to federal habeas review is
based on the assumption that the federal habeas petitioner had a fair opportunity to be heard in state
court. See id.
222. See Sloss, supra note 20, at 988–92.
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III. Treaty Delegations and International Judgments
Part II addressed the domestic application of treaties that directly constrain the authority of state governments. Part III addresses cases, like Medellin, where a treaty delegates authority to an international tribunal and the
tribunal issues a judgment that appears to constrain the authority of state
governments. The analysis is divided into three sections. The first section
considers whether a binding ICJ judgment has the same domestic effect
under the Supremacy Clause as a treaty of equivalent content. The second
section addresses limits on the ICJ’s remedial authority. The final section
addresses policy issues related to treaty-based international delegations.
A. International Judgments and the Supremacy Clause
It is generally agreed that valid ICJ judgments are binding on the United
States under international law.223 The question arises: assuming that an ICJ
judgment is valid and binding under international law, does that judgment
have the same domestic effect under the Supremacy Clause as a treaty of
equivalent content? In other words, does an ICJ judgment ordering the
United States to do X have the same domestic effect as a treaty obligating
the United States to do X?
To address this question, it is helpful to begin with some simplifying
assumptions. First, this discussion focuses exclusively on treaties that create
a non-discretionary duty under international law for the United States to
comply with the judgment of an international tribunal. Second, the discussion focuses exclusively on cases where a tribunal’s judgment creates an international obligation of a type such that state officers have the capacity to
promote or hinder performance of the treaty obligation to comply with the
judgment. Third, assuming that a federal rule compelling state officers to
comply with the tribunal’s judgment would violate the anti-commandeering
principle in some cases, but not others,224 this discussion focuses exclusively
on cases that do not raise an anti-commandeering problem. If these three
conditions are satisfied, and the tribunal’s judgment is valid and binding
under international law, I contend that the Supremacy Clause makes that
judgment binding on state government officers under domestic law.
Professor McGinnis defends a much more restrictive view of the domestic
effects of decisions by international tribunals.225 To defend that view, he
makes some persuasive policy arguments about the dangers of international
223. See Statute of the International Court of Justice [hereinafter ICJ Statute], art. 59, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055 (stating that the Court’s decision has “binding force . . . between the parties”); Medellin v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008) (“No one disputes that the Avena decision . . . constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the United States.”).
224. See supra notes 175–79 and accompanying text.
225. See McGinnis, supra note 24, at 1717–24.
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delegations.226 The question, though, is how best to address those policy
concerns within our existing constitutional framework. One possibility
would be to amend the Constitution to distinguish between treaties that
delegate authority to international tribunals and those that do not. Some
other countries have adopted this strategy,227 but Professor McGinnis does
not recommend this approach. Instead, he advances two proposals. First, he
argues that international agreements delegating authority to international
tribunals must be handled domestically as Article II treaties, not congressional-executive agreements.228 I have no quarrel with this recommendation.
His second proposal, however, is more problematic. Professor McGinnis
argues that judgments of international tribunals should not be binding on
domestic government officials unless the treaty delegating authority to the
international tribunal includes a clear statement specifying that the tribunal’s judgments will bind government officers under domestic law.229 There
are two problems with this proposal. First, like the intent-based approach to
self-execution generally, it conflates treaty interpretation issues with domestic legal issues. As the two-step approach makes clear, the question whether
an international tribunal’s judgment creates domestic legal duties for domestic government officers is a question of domestic law, not treaty interpretation. Nevertheless, Professor McGinnis wants courts to approach the
issue as if it were a treaty interpretation issue. In effect, his proposed clear
statement rule would have courts examine treaty text to answer a question of
domestic constitutional law.
This raises the second problem with Professor McGinnis’s proposal: his
analysis tacitly assumes that the Supremacy Clause says nothing about the
domestic effects of treaties that delegate authority to international tribunals.
That assumption is plainly incorrect. The Supremacy Clause creates domestic legal duties for state government officers to conform their conduct to the
nation’s treaty obligations in the circumstances described in Part II.A
above.230 The Clause does not distinguish between treaties that delegate authority to international tribunals and those that do not: it states explicitly
that “all treaties . . . [are] the supreme Law of the Land.”231 It is not permissible to interpret the phrase “all treaties” to mean “only those treaties that
do not delegate authority to international tribunals.” Therefore, if a treaty
226. I do not mean to endorse Professor McGinnis’s policy arguments in toto because I think he may
overstate the dangers of international delegations. Nevertheless, I agree that international delegations
pose real risks and he does an excellent job of explaining those risks.
227. For example, the Polish Constitution requires a two-thirds majority vote, instead of a simple
majority, for treaties that “delegate to an international organization or international institution the competence of organs of State authority in certain matters.” See Lech Garlicki, Malgorzata Masternak-Kubiak
and Krzysztof Wojtowicz, Poland, in The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement, supra
note 6, at 377–84.
228. See McGinnis, supra note 24, at 1742–57.
229. Id. at 1714–17.
230. See supra Part II.A.
231. U.S. Const. art VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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creates a non-discretionary duty for the United States to comply with an
international tribunal’s judgment, the conditions specified in Part II.A are
satisfied, and the tribunal issues a valid judgment such that state officers
have the capacity to promote or hinder performance of the nation’s treaty
obligation, the tribunal’s judgment binds those officers as a matter of domestic law because the Supremacy Clause says so,232 unless the treaty makers
adopt a clear statement to alter the ordinary operation of the Supremacy
Clause.233
One might object that judgments of international tribunals are not the
“Law of the Land” because the Supremacy Clause does not identify such
judgments as an enumerated category of supreme federal law. This objection
is formally correct: the judgment of an international tribunal is not supreme
federal law. However, a treaty provision creating a non-discretionary duty to
comply with the judgment of an international tribunal is the “Law of the
Land” under the express terms of the Constitution. Therefore, such a treaty
provision is binding on state government officers in precisely the same circumstances as other treaty provisions that create non-discretionary duties for
the nation—i.e., when state officers have the capacity to promote or hinder
treaty performance and application of treaty duties to state officers would
not violate the anti-commandeering rule.234 There is no substantive difference between a treaty obligating the United States to do X and a treaty
obligating the United States to comply with an international judgment ordering the nation to do X. Therefore, if the United States ratifies a treaty
creating a non-discretionary duty for the nation to comply with the judgments of an international tribunal, and that tribunal issues a valid, binding
judgment ordering the United States to do X, that judgment is binding on
state government officers under the Supremacy Clause in precisely the same
way as a treaty obligating the United States to do X.
B. Limits on the ICJ’s Remedial Authority
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Medellin v. Texas to decide
whether “the ICJ’s judgment in Avena [is] directly enforceable as domestic
law in a state court in the United States.”235 Clearly, the Avena judgment
would not be binding on state government officers under domestic law if it
was not a valid judgment under international law. What are the criteria for
determining the validity of an ICJ judgment? Under well-established legal
principles, if Congress enacts a statute delegating adjudicatory power to a
federal administrative tribunal, the tribunal’s decision is not valid if the
232. As discussed above, the conclusion that an international tribunal’s judgment binds domestic
government officers, without more, tells us very little about the modalities for enforcing that obligation
in a judicial proceeding. See supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 190–203 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 173–86 and accompanying text.
235. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008).
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initial delegation of authority was invalid or the decision was ultra vires—
i.e., the tribunal acted beyond the scope of delegated authority.236 By analogy, an ICJ decision would be invalid if the initial delegation of authority to
the ICJ was invalid or the ICJ’s decision was ultra vires.
Whether and to what extent U.S. treaty makers can legitimately delegate
decisionmaking authority to an international tribunal is primarily a question of domestic constitutional law. Other scholars have debated that constitutional issue;237 this Article expresses no view on the constitutionality of
treaty-based international delegations. Instead, this Article focuses on the
second issue: assuming that the initial delegation of authority to the ICJ was
valid, under what circumstances would an ICJ decision be ultra vires? As the
two-step approach makes clear, this is a treaty interpretation question, not a
constitutional law question.
The ICJ’s decisionmaking authority in Avena was based primarily on two
treaties: the Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ Statute”)238
and the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.239 The Optional Protocol clearly authorized Mexico to initiate proceedings against the United States before the International Court of
Justice.240 However, the Optional Protocol says nothing about the ICJ’s remedial powers. In Avena, the United States effectively conceded that it had
breached an international obligation.241 The main issue in dispute was the
appropriate remedy for that breach.
Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute grants the ICJ broad remedial powers: it
authorizes the ICJ to decide “the nature or extent of the reparation to be
made for the breach of an international obligation.”242 But the ICJ did not
decide Avena under Article 36(2); it decided Avena under Article 36(1). Article 36(1) grants the ICJ jurisdiction to decide “matters specially provided
for in . . . treaties.”243 Article 36(2) applies only to claims against states who
have submitted a declaration “recogniz[ing] as compulsory ipso facto and

236. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 2 Administrative Law Treatise 975–76 (5th ed. 2002).
237. See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 24; Bradley & Kelley, supra note 166; Andrew T. Guzman &
Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1693 (2008); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Article III and Supranational Judicial Review, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 833 (2007); Edward T.
Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1492 (2004).
238. ICJ Statute, supra note 223; see Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
12 (Mar. 31).
239. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, art. X, Apr. 24, 1963,
21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.
240. See id., art. 1 (“Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention . . .
may . . . be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to
the present Protocol.”).
241. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 4; Counter-Memorial of the
United States of America 178 (Nov. 2, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=
3&p2=3&k=18&case=128&code=mus&p3=1.
242. ICJ Statute, supra note 223, art. 36.
243. Id.
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without special agreement . . . the jurisdiction of the Court.”244 The United
States filed an Article 36(2) declaration with the ICJ in 1946, but it terminated that declaration in 1985.245 Thus, when Mexico filed its claim against
the United States in 2003, Article 36(2) was inapplicable, and Article 36(1)
provided the only available basis for ICJ jurisdiction.
Article 36(1) says nothing about the ICJ’s remedial powers. Article 36(2)
grants the ICJ much more open-ended authority than Article 36(1).
Whereas 36(1) applies only to “matters specially provided for in” treaties,
36(2) potentially applies to “any question of international law.”246 Given
that Article 36(2) grants the ICJ expansive jurisdiction and Article 36(1)
grants much narrower jurisdiction, it is questionable whether the ICJ’s
broad remedial powers under Article 36(2) apply to cases arising under
36(1), especially because the only textual reference to remedial powers is in
36(2).
Domestic courts in the United States exercise “inherent” remedial powers.247 There are plausible functional arguments supporting the view that
the ICJ Statute grants the ICJ broad remedial powers comparable to those
exercised by domestic courts. On the other hand, there are also plausible
functional arguments supporting a much narrower view of the ICJ’s remedial authority.248 It is not my purpose to resolve that debate here. My point
is simply that the text of the ICJ Statute provides at best weak support for
the widely shared, unstated assumption that Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute
grants the ICJ broad remedial powers. Nor do functional rationales favoring
a broad view of the ICJ’s remedial powers provide a “slam dunk” argument
supporting ICJ authority. An ICJ remedial order would be ultra vires if the
Court purported to exercise remedial powers beyond the scope of authority
that the states who created the ICJ delegated to that tribunal.
If the remedial powers granted to the ICJ under Article 36(2) do not
apply to cases arising under Article 36(1), then there is at least a colorable
legal argument that the ICJ judgment in Avena was ultra vires. If that judgment was ultra vires, then it was not binding on the United States under
international law. If the judgment was not binding on the nation, then it
was not binding on domestic government actors under U.S. domestic law.
Although I am not persuaded that the ICJ’s decision was ultra vires, the ultra
244. Id.
245. See Shabtai Rosenne, Documents on the International Court of Justice 782–84 (3rd
ed. 1991).
246. ICJ Statute, supra note 223, art. 36.
247. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
248. Professor McGinnis offers some persuasive functional reasons why the United States should be
cautious about delegating authority to international tribunals. See McGinnis, supra note 24, at 1717–28.
He invokes those arguments to support a narrow view of the domestic effects of international delegations.
As explained above, I believe his focus on domestic effects is misguided. Nevertheless, one might reasonably adduce similar policy arguments to support a narrow view of the ICJ’s delegated remedial powers,
especially under Article 36(1).
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vires argument provides a more convincing rationale for the outcome in Medellin than any of the arguments offered by the Court’s leading academic
defenders.
C. Future Delegations
The core policy issue underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellin, which has fuelled much of the related scholarly commentary, arises from
the confluence of two factors. First, the treaties at issue in Medellin granted
the ICJ authority to issue a judgment that was binding on the United States
under international law. Second, the ICJ exercised that authority by issuing
a remedial order targeted directly at state government officials.249 The confluence of these two factors raises, in the starkest form, the policy concerns
that Professor McGinnis correctly identifies in his article.250 I suggest that
U.S. treaty makers could address those concerns by adopting reservations
specifically designed to limit the authority of international tribunals to issue
judgments that bind state and local government officers.
When the United States ratifies a treaty granting authority to an international tribunal to issue judgments that bind the nation under international
law, the treaty makers could include two conditions in the instrument of
ratification. First, they could adopt a reservation stipulating that the United
States will be bound to comply with the tribunal’s judgments only insofar as
federal executive and judicial officers have the requisite statutory and/or constitutional authority to implement those judgments. If the tribunal orders
the United States to take steps beyond the scope of authority of federal officers under domestic law, the United States will make its best efforts, but it
will not be legally bound to implement the tribunal’s order.251 Second, the
treaty makers could adopt a declaration stipulating that the tribunal’s judgments shall not be binding on state government officers under domestic law
unless Congress enacts legislation directing those officers to implement the
tribunal’s judgments. The proposed reservation would limit the scope of
U.S. international legal obligations, thereby avoiding unwanted breaches of
the nation’s treaty obligations. The proposed declaration would limit the
domestic effects of the tribunal’s judgments, thereby ensuring that Congress
249. The ICJ issued an order requiring a judicial hearing in domestic court for prisoners detained by
state governments (not the federal government). See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.)
2004 I.C.J 12 (Mar. 31). ICJ judges were presumably aware that statutory constraints on federal habeas
proceedings created substantial uncertainty as to whether federal courts had the necessary statutory jurisdiction to provide the judicial hearing required by Avena. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005)
(addressing statutory restrictions on federal habeas jurisdiction). Thus, the ICJ had to assume that state
courts were the only courts with jurisdiction to provide the mandated judicial hearings.
250. See McGinnis, supra note 24, at 1720–25.
251. Canada has sometimes adopted reservations to treaties to signal the inability of the federal government to mandate compliance by provincial governments. See Maurice Copithorne, National Treaty Law
and Practice: Canada, in National Treaty Law and Practice 91, 95–98, supra note 6.

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\53-1\HLI103.txt

2012 / Executing Foster v. Neilson

unknown

Seq: 47

13-FEB-12

13:33

181

makes a conscious policy choice before any such judgment creates binding
domestic legal obligations for state government officers.
The recommended approach fully addresses the policy concerns associated
with future treaty-based international delegations. Moreover, it has three
distinct advantages over Professor McGinnis’s proposal. First, and most importantly, this approach is consistent with the text of the Supremacy Clause.
In contrast, Professor McGinnis’s proposal tacitly assumes that the
Supremacy Clause is meaningless.252 Second, the recommended approach
promotes compliance with the nation’s treaty obligations by utilizing reservations to limit the scope of those obligations. In contrast, Professor McGinnis’s proposal effectively establishes a default rule of noncompliance, because
the treaty makers’ failure to adopt the clear statement he advocates would
lead to noncompliance with a tribunal judgment requiring domestic implementation until Congress enacted legislation to implement that
judgment.253
Third, the recommended approach would provide notice to other states
about the United States’ plans for treaty implementation by including relevant reservations and declarations in the instrument of ratification. In contrast, under Professor McGinnis’s proposal, the United States would convey
information to other states, in the form of a clear statement, only in cases
where it intends to implement tribunal decisions domestically.254 In cases
where implementation of a tribunal’s decision is dependent on congressional
action—i.e., in those cases where the risk of noncompliance is greatest—the
United States would not convey any advance information to other states,
because there would be no clear statement. Thus, Professor McGinnis’s proposal creates a perverse signaling regime wherein the United States would
provide advance signals to other states in cases where the risk of noncompliance is low, but not advance warning in cases where that risk is higher. The
failure to provide any advance warning of noncompliance would exacerbate
the costs of noncompliance.
One potential objection is that the recommended approach does not address the problem of existing treaties that delegate authority to international
tribunals. Professor Damrosch notes that the United States “remains a ‘repeat player’ at the ICJ and is liable to be sued there again under any of
approximately seventy treaties that are still in force for the United
252. See supra notes 230–33 and accompanying text.
253. More precisely, under Professor McGinnis’s proposal, noncompliance would result whenever a
tribunal ordered the United States to take steps that required domestic implementation, and Congress
failed to enact the legislation necessary to authorize or compel some government officer to take the
necessary steps.
254. As noted above, Professor McGinnis argues that judgments of international tribunals should not
be binding on domestic government officials unless the treaty delegating authority to the international
tribunal includes a clear statement specifying that the tribunal’s judgments will bind government officers under domestic law. McGinnis, supra note 24, at 1714–17. Under this approach, other states
receive advance notice that the United States will implement its treaty obligations, but they do not
receive advance notice if the United States decides not to implement its treaty obligations.

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\53-1\HLI103.txt

182

unknown

Seq: 48

13-FEB-12

13:33

Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 53

States.”255 It is difficult to assess the risk that one of those treaties will result
in a suit in which the ICJ issues a remedial order targeted at state government officers. Even so, it would be wise for the United States government to
conduct a detailed study to address that question. For any treaty where the
risk of such a scenario is significant, the United States could mitigate the
risk by withdrawing from the treaty and then rejoining the treaty subject to
reservations and declarations along the lines suggested above.256
IV. Three Readings of Medellin
José Ernesto Medellı́n was a Mexican national convicted of murder and
sentenced to death in Texas state court.257 Texas officials violated U.S. treaty
obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”)
by failing to advise him of his right to consult with a consular officer. After
an unsuccessful appeal, Medellı́n filed his first state habeas corpus petition,
raising a claim under the VCCR. The state trial court denied that petition
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.258 Mexico then brought a
claim against the United States in the International Court of Justice on behalf of Medellı́n and other Mexican nationals (the Avena case).259 The ICJ
issued its Avena judgment in March 2004; it ordered the United States to
provide judicial hearings for 51 Mexican nationals, including Medellı́n. 260
After the ICJ decision, Medellı́n filed a second habeas petition in Texas
state court, arguing that it would be illegal for Texas to subject him to
capital punishment without first providing the judicial hearing mandated
by Avena, because Article 94 of the U.N. Charter created a non-discretionary
duty for the United States to comply with the ICJ judgment in Avena, and
that duty was directly binding on Texas government officials under the express terms of the Supremacy Clause.261 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Medellı́n’s second habeas petition in November 2006 without
reaching a decision on the merits of his argument.262 The U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the Texas court’s decision in March 2008, holding that Article 94 of the U.N. Charter is not self-executing.263 Texas subsequently exe-

255. Lori F. Damrosch, Medellin and Sanchez-Llamas: Treaties from John Jay to John Roberts, in Continuity and Change, supra note 17, at 451, 463.
256. Most treaties that delegate authority to international tribunals include withdrawal clauses. If
there are any such treaties that do not include withdrawal clauses, this strategy would not be viable.
257. See Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
258. Id. at 321–22.
259. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
260. See id. at ¶¶ 128–41, 153.
261. Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d at 323.
262. Id. at 352.
263. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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cuted Medellı́n in August 2008. It is unclear whether Texas ever provided
the judicial hearing mandated by Avena.264
The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellin is open to several interpretations.265 This Part considers three possible interpretations of the Court’s
non-self-execution holding in Medellin. The Court’s holding means either:
(1) that Article 94 of the United Nations Charter does not create non-discretionary duties for the United States under international law; or (2) that Article 94 creates non-discretionary duties for the nation, but it does not impose
any binding obligations on state officers under the Supremacy Clause; or (3)
that Article 94 imposes binding obligations on state officers, but those obligations are not judicially enforceable. The intent-based approach to selfexecution blurs the vital distinctions among these three possible interpretations. The two-step approach helps clarify that these really are three very
different interpretations of the Court’s opinion. Under the first interpretation, Medellin is wrong as a matter of international law. Under the second,
Medellin is flatly inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause. If the third interpretation is correct, the Court probably violated the Due Process Clause.
A. The First Interpretation
Under the first possible interpretation, the Supreme Court held that Article 94 of the United Nations Charter does not create non-discretionary duties for the United States under international law. There is some language in
the Court’s opinion to support this interpretation.266 Commentators disagree
whether this is the best construction of the Court’s decision in Medellin.267
However, there is no dispute that if this is what the Court held, its holding
is incorrect as a matter of treaty interpretation. The United States government has consistently maintained that Article 94 creates a non-discretionary
duty for the United States to comply with valid ICJ judgments.268 No com264. In his brief to the Supreme Court, the Texas Solicitor General argued that Texas courts had
already provided the judicial hearing mandated by Avena. See Brief for Respondent at 49–50, Medellin v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984). However, Texas devoted only one page of a 50-page brief to
supporting this argument. See id. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not rely on this argument to support
its decision in Medellin, see 552 U.S. 491, and Medellı́n himself vigorously denied that he had received
the required judicial hearing. See Brief for Petitioner, at 12–15, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)
(No. 06-984).
265. See, e.g., ABA/ASIL Joint Task Force on Treaties in U.S. Law, Report (March 2009), available at
http://www.asil.org/files/TreatiesTaskForceReport.pdf (analyzing various possible interpretations of the
Supreme Court decision in Medellin).
266. See, e.g., Medellin, 552 U.S. at 508 (stating that Article 94 “does not provide that the United
States ‘shall’ or ‘must’ comply with an ICJ decision”); id. at 510 (“Noncompliance with an ICJ judgment
. . . [was] always regarded as an option by the Executive and ratifying Senate during and after consideration of the U.N. Charter.”).
267. Compare Vázquez, supra note 3, at 660–65 (defending this interpretation of Medellin) with Bradley, supra note 2, at 168–76 (criticizing this interpretation).
268. See, e.g., International Court of Justice, Written Observations of the United States of America on
the Application for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Aug. 29, 2008), at 1–2, available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=11&case=139&code=musa&p3=1.
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mentator has seriously contested this proposition.269 Although, under the
first interpretation, Medellin is incorrect on treaty interpretation grounds,
this interpretation of Medellin is not constitutionally problematic. A treaty
that does not create non-discretionary duties for the nation under international law does not create non-discretionary duties for government officers
under domestic law.270
B. The Second Interpretation
Under the second interpretation of Medellin, the Supreme Court held that
Article 94 imposes non-discretionary duties on the United States under international law, but does not create non-discretionary duties for state government officers under domestic law. This interpretation is generally
consistent with Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion in Medellin.271 However, it is impossible to reconcile with the text of the Supremacy Clause.
Under a bare minimalist interpretation of the Supremacy Clause, the Clause
means that a treaty imposing non-discretionary duties on the nation creates
non-discretionary duties for state government officers if: (a) those officers
have the capacity to promote or hinder treaty performance; (b) application of
treaty duties to state officers would not violate the anti-commandeering
rule; and (c) the treaty makers did not adopt conditions to alter the ordinary
operation of the Supremacy Clause.272
In Avena, the ICJ ordered the United States to provide judicial hearings
for 51 Mexican nationals, including Medellı́n. 273 The second interpretation
assumes that Article 94 of the U.N. Charter creates a non-discretionary duty
for the United States to provide the judicial hearings mandated by Avena.
There is no question that Texas courts had the legal authority under Texas
law to provide the required judicial hearing for those prisoners named in the
Avena decision who were detained under authority of Texas state law (including Medellı́n). 274 A federal rule obligating Texas courts to provide that
judicial hearing does not raise an anti-commandeering problem because the
anti-commandeering rule does not apply to state courts.275 Finally, when the
Senate consented to ratification of the U.N. Charter, it did not include any
statement in the resolution of ratification to alter the ordinary operation of
the Supremacy Clause.276 Thus, Article 94 is directly binding on Texas
269. Although Professor Vázquez defends this interpretation of the Court’s opinion in Medellin, he
agrees that, under this interpretation, the Court’s opinion is incorrect as a matter of treaty interpretation.
See Vázquez, supra note 3, at 666–67.
270. See Sloss, supra note 3, at 25 n.103.
271. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–14.
272. See supra Part II.A.
273. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J 12, 128–41, 153 (Mar. 31).
274. Section 5(a)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure expressly authorized Texas state courts
to adjudicate Medellı́n’s claim. See infra notes 283–85 and accompanying text.
275. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997).
276. See 91 Cong. Rec. 8134, 8189-90 (July 28, 1945). In Medellin, the Court justified its non-selfexecution holding, in part, by invoking statements from the Senate record associated with ratification of
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courts under the express terms of the Supremacy Clause. Therefore, under
the second interpretation of Medellin, the Court’s non-self-execution holding
is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the Supremacy Clause.
C. The Third Interpretation
Under the third interpretation of Medellin, Article 94 of the U.N. Charter
is supreme federal law and binding on Texas officials under the Supremacy
Clause, but is “not judicially enforceable.” Under this interpretation, Texas
officials violated supreme federal law when they executed Medellı́n, unless
Texas courts provided the judicial hearing required by Avena before they
executed him.277 Let us assume, as the Supreme Court apparently assumed,
that Texas never did provide the Avena hearing.278 Given this assumption,
the Supreme Court’s non-self-execution holding ostensibly justifies the
Texas court’s refusal to decide the merits of Medellı́n’s Article 94 argument.
However, under this view, the Court’s non-self-execution holding violated
the Due Process Clause.
When a state threatens to impose criminal sanctions on someone, and that
person alleges that the threatened sanction is unlawful, the Due Process
Clause requires a judicial hearing on the merits of the argument, provided
the argument is raised at the first available opportunity in accordance with
established procedural rules.279 Medellı́n filed his second state habeas petition in 2005. At that time, Texas was threatening to impose capital punishment. Medellı́n argued that it would be illegal for Texas to subject him to
capital punishment without first providing the judicial hearing mandated
by Avena, because Article 94 created a non-discretionary duty for the United
States to comply with the ICJ judgment in Avena, and that duty was directly
binding on Texas government officials under the Supremacy Clause. Medellı́n could not have raised that claim when he filed his first habeas petition in
1998 because the ICJ did not decide Avena until 2004. The Texas court
conceded that Medellı́n’s Article 94 claim was unavailable in 1998.280 Thus,
he raised his claim at the first available opportunity.281
the U.N. Charter. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 510–11. None of those statements was part of the
Senate resolution of ratification. Unlike the text of the Supremacy Clause, none of those statements
addresses the question whether the U.N. Charter creates non-discretionary duties for state officers under
domestic law. It is unclear whether Chief Justice Roberts, the author of the majority opinion, thought
those statements altered the ordinary operation of the Supremacy Clause. However, if that is what he
believed, he was clearly mistaken. It is untenable to claim that domestic law accords more weight to
statements by individual Senators or Executive Branch officials than it does to the constitutional text.
277. See supra note 264.
278. The Supreme Court decision in Medellin did not address the Texas Solicitor General’s argument
that Texas had already provided the required Avena hearing. If the Court had accepted that argument,
though, it could simply have ruled that the case was moot, since the only relief Medellı́n requested was
the judicial hearing mandated by Avena.
279. See supra Part II.B.
280. See Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
281. The fact that Medellı́n failed to raise his VCCR claim at the first available opportunity is immaterial. His second habeas petition raised an entirely different claim, based on Article 94 and Avena.
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Medellı́n also raised his Article 94 claim in accordance with state procedural rules. Section 5(a)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure permits
convicted prisoners to file a second habeas petition in cases where “the current claims and issues . . . could not have been presented previously in a
timely initial application . . . because the factual or legal basis for the claim
was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application.” 282 Article
94 of the U.N. Charter and Avena constituted the “legal basis for the claim”
presented in Medellı́n’s second habeas petition.283 That legal basis was “unavailable” in 1998, when he filed his first habeas petition, because Article
94 did not become applicable to Medellı́n’s case until the ICJ decided Avena
in March 2004. Thus, Texas procedural law explicitly authorized Medellı́n’s
petition, and he presented that petition in accordance with state procedural
rules.284
Since Medellı́n argued that Texas was threatening to impose an unlawful
criminal sanction, and since he raised that claim at the first available opportunity in accordance with state procedural rules, he had a constitutional
right under the Due Process Clause to demand a judicial hearing on the
merits of his claim. Under the third interpretation, the Supreme Court’s
non-self-execution holding violated the Due Process Clause by denying Medellı́n his constitutional right to a judicial hearing.
*****
In sum, the Court’s inscrutable opinion in Medellin is subject to three
different interpretations. Under the first interpretation, Medellin is wrong as
a matter of international law. Under the second, Medellin is flatly inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause. If the third interpretation is correct, the
Court probably violated the Due Process Clause.
Medellin illustrates the problems with the intent-based approach to selfexecution. The Court’s opinion in Medellin is analytically incoherent because
it is unclear whether the Court’s non-self-execution holding is based on international law or domestic law. Moreover, assuming that the Court’s holding is based on domestic law, it is unclear whether the Court employed a
282. Tex. Code Crim. Pro, art. 11.071, § 5(a)(1) (emphasis added).
283. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Avena judgment did not provide either a
“factual” or “legal” basis for the claim advanced in Medellı́n’s second habeas petition. See Medellin, 223
S.W.3d at 348–52. Its conclusion that Avena did not provide a new “factual” basis for Medellı́n’s claim
was clearly correct. However, its conclusion that Article 94 and Avena did not provide a new “legal”
basis for that claim was clearly incorrect. In essence, the Texas court ruled that there was no “legal” basis
for Medellı́n’s claim because the Avena judgment itself was not federal law. See id. at 352. In so holding,
the court simply disregarded Medellin’s textually irrefutable argument that Article 94 of the United
Nations Charter is federal law, which provided a new legal basis for his claim.
284. It is important to distinguish between Medellı́n’s claim and the claim advanced by Mario Bustillo, one of the petitioners in the Sanchez-Llamas case. Bustillo’s claim was clearly barred by state procedural default rules because he failed to raise his claim at the first available opportunity. See SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 341–42 (2006). In contrast, Texas law explicitly authorized Medellı́n’s
claim because the “legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous
application.” Tex. Code Crim. Pro, art. 11.071, § 5(a)(1).
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primary law or remedial law concept of non-self-execution. The Court’s
opinion relies heavily on a fictitious “intent of the treaty makers” that has
no basis in the treaty text or in any authoritative document adopted by the
Senate at the time of ratification.285 Finally, the Court’s misguided reliance
on the intent-based approach to self-execution yielded an opinion that, depending on one’s preferred interpretation, is either wrong as a matter of
treaty interpretation, inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause, or violated
Medellı́n’s rights under the Due Process Clause. The Court could have
avoided all of these problems by applying the two-step approach to selfexecution.
V. Conclusion
The doctrine of self-executing treaties is analytically incoherent because it
directs courts to utilize treaty interpretation tools to answer questions of
domestic constitutional law. The question whether a treaty is self-executing
is actually two very different questions, masquerading as a single question.
The first question is: “what does the treaty obligate the United States to
do?” This is a treaty interpretation issue. The second question is: “which
government actors within the United States have the power and duty to
implement the treaty domestically?” This is a domestic legal issue, not a
treaty interpretation issue. Examining the treaty text to answer the second
question is like studying the text of a private contract to determine the
correct interpretation of federal securities laws. No matter how carefully one
examines the contract, the answer is simply not there. The doctrine of selfexecution will remain hopelessly incoherent until courts and commentators
learn to distinguish correctly between treaty interpretation issues and domestic implementation issues.
The core policy issue in Medellin arose from the confluence of two factors.
First, the treaties at issue granted authority to an international tribunal to
issue decisions binding on the United States under international law. Second, the ICJ issued a remedial order that, while directed formally to the
United States, as a practical matter required implementation by state government officers. Never before had an individual litigant asked the Supreme
Court to order state government officers to implement a judgment of an
international tribunal. The petitioner’s claim that the ICJ order was directly
binding on state government officers, as a matter of domestic law, raised
novel questions about the international legal order and the autonomy of
States within the United States.
The treaty makers could have addressed the underlying policy issue by
adopting reservations to limit the scope of the ICJ’s decisionmaking authority, and by adopting declarations to limit the domestic effects of ICJ judg285. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–14 (2008).
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ments. However, the treaty makers never adopted any such reservations or
declarations, in part because they did not anticipate that the ICJ would
exercise its decisionmaking power in a manner that called for implementation of ICJ judgments by sub-national government authorities. Now that
the United States has received clear notice about the risks of ratifying treaties that delegate binding decisionmaking authority to international tribunals, it is the responsibility of the federal political branches to adopt
measures to mitigate those risks. As explained in Part III above, the treaty
makers have the power to adopt a combination of reservations and declarations that would resolve the basic policy problem presented by Medellin.
Absent action by the federal political branches, though, the Supreme
Court has a duty to apply the Supremacy Clause as written. Under the
Supremacy Clause, a treaty is binding on state government officers if the
treaty imposes non-discretionary duties on the United States under international law, state officers have the capacity to promote or hinder treaty performance, and application of treaty duties to state officers would not violate
the anti-commandeering rule. The Clause applies both to treaties that delegate decisionmaking authority to international tribunals and those that do
not.
Whether, and in what circumstances, a treaty is judicially enforceable
against state officers is a separate issue. This Article does not analyze the
myriad issues associated with judicial enforcement of treaties that are binding on state government officers under domestic law. However, the Article
does identify a narrow set of cases in which the Due Process Clause mandates
judicial enforcement of treaties. When the state threatens to impose criminal sanctions on someone, and that person claims the sanction would violate
a treaty-based, non-discretionary duty, the Due Process Clause requires a
judicial hearing on the merits, provided the individual raises the argument
at the first available opportunity in accordance with established procedural
rules. State and federal judicial decisions in Medellin probably violated the
petitioner’s constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause.

